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陆奥宗光作为日本外务大臣 ,以外交手段“狡狯”而闻名 ,对促成甲午对华开战负 有重大的责任。但在日本国内 ,长期以来流行一种观点 ,认为陆奥外交是和平主义的。此观点能否成立 ,值得重新研究。本文认为 ,日本的“六·二出兵”最可表明“陆奥外交”的性质。从日本内阁做出派兵决议的时间、日本派兵的实际情况、出兵的规模和部署、按照《战时大本营条例》成立大本营等方面看 ,日本历史学者关于“六·二出兵”的目的诸说 ,如“出于被迫”、“和平目的”、“维护势力均衡”等等 ,都是基于主观臆测而提出的 ,难以凭信。继之分析日本历史学者上述诸说的 4条根据 :(一 )日本假想敌的改变 ,即从中国变为西欧各国 ;(二 )日本军备不能独立 ,不足以支持一场大规模的侵略战争 ;(三 )日本舆论倾向于和平解决朝鲜问题 ;(四 )当时的国际形势决定了日本出兵只能限于和平的目的。认为这几条用来证明日本“六·二出兵”不具有战争目的的理由 ,无一是能够站得住脚的。要确定“陆奥外交”的性质 ,必须根据陆奥宗光本人的言行作出判断。从其自述材料看 ,他本人不但不否认自己对甲午开战的责任 ,而且还以此而自诩。可见 ,“陆奥外交”决不是什么“和平主义”外交 ,而是预谋战争的外交。
As the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Lu Zonguang is famous for its “sly” diplomatic tactics, and is responsible for contributing to the war on China by the Sino-Japanese War. However, in Japan, it has long been popular to think that diplomatic diplomacy in the mainland of the continent is pacifist. Whether this view holds or not is worth re-studying. This article argues that Japan’s “6.2 troops sent out” the most shows that “Mutsu diplomatic” nature. From the time when the Japanese cabinet made the resolution on the dispatch of troops, the actual situation of sending troops to Japan, the scale and deployment of troops deployed, and the purpose of setting up a stronghold under the “War Camp Ordinance”, the Japanese historians said that “ Such as ”out of necessity,“ ”peaceful purposes,“ ”maintaining a balance of power,“ etc., are all based on subjective assumptions and are difficult to rely on. Followed by an analysis of the four foundations of the Japanese historians mentioned above: (i) the change in Japan’s imaginary enemy from China to Western European countries; (ii) Japan’s military armaments can not be independent enough to support a massive war of aggression; C) that Japanese public opinion tends to resolve the issue of North Korea peacefully; and (d) the prevailing international situation decided that Japan’s military deployment could only be limited to the purpose of peace. Considering these few reasons that justify Japan’s ”June 2 troop deployment“ for not having a war purpose, none of them can hold its ground. In order to determine the nature of ”land-diplomacy,“ we must make judgments based on what we say and do. From his read-only materials, he not only did not deny his own responsibility for the war in Sino-Japanese War, but also defiled himself. It can be seen that ”Mutoh diplomacy“ is by no means a ”pacifist" diplomacy, but a diplomacy premeditated for war.