Under the carbon trading policy,we establish a Stackelberg game model with the manufacturer as the leader and the retailer as the follower.Considering low carbon reduction of manufacturers and retailers,on the basis of low carbon propaganda,we study carbon trading price and the consumer preference for low carbon emission reduction decision-making of supply chain and the effect of government subsidy policy choice without government subsidies and single subsidy policy,and further explore external coordination and government subsidies internal coordination of supply chain strategies for the impact of supply chain decisions.The research shows that when the carbon price is at a low level,consumers low-carbon preference can motivate manufacturers and retailers to conduct low-carbon emission reduction.When the carbon trading price is at a high level,it is difficult to promote the low-carbon behavior of supply chain enterprises only by relying on consumers low-carbon preference.When the carbon trading price is fixed,if consumers have low carbon awareness,retailers will be more motivated to promote low carbon under the subsidy strategy.However,with the increase of consumers low carbon awareness,the level of low carbon publicity under the external coordination strategy will be higher.For manufacturers,their low carbon emission reduction level is always optimal under externally coordinated subsidy strategy.In addition,in terms of social welfare,when the carbon trading price is fixed,the coordinated subsidy strategy is better than the single subsidy strategy and the non-subsidy strategy,and the social welfare under the external coordination strategy is the highest.