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本文用两个国家的政府及其企业参与的两阶段博弈模型,分析了《保护知识产权的巴黎公约》形成的经济根源,从理论上证明了该公约在当时各国政府自主决定专利保护强度的条件下仍然能够促进技术创新。而且,该模型还揭示出随着市场规模的扩大,参与博弈的政府都会倾向于延长专利保护期,从而在某种程度上预测了WTO框架下《与贸易有关的知识产权保护协议》的出现。
In this paper, we use the two-stage game model involving the governments of two countries and their enterprises to analyze the economic roots of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property. It proves theoretically the condition that the convention decides the degree of patent protection autonomously at that time Under the still able to promote technological innovation. Moreover, the model also reveals that as the market size expands, governments participating in the game tend to extend the patent protection period, thus predicting to some extent the emergence of the WTO Agreement on the Protection of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property.