不完全信息下房地产价格的演化博弈分析

来源 :数学的实践与认识 | 被引量 : 0次 | 上传用户:ppasu
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基于PAB(Pay-As-Bid)竞价机制,探讨不完全信息情况下供需关系对房屋成交价格的影响.在购房者对房屋价格预期不确定和购房者有限理性的假设下,利用鲁棒优化技术和演化博弈论中的“复制动态”思想,提出鲁棒演化博弈均衡的概念,建立相应的复制动态系统,并对系统的鲁棒演化均衡的渐进稳定性进行分析,得到在不同市场供需情况下购房者价格策略演化的一般规律.最后选用数值算例对模型加以验证. Based on the PAB (Pay-As-Bid) bidding mechanism, this paper explores the impact of the supply-demand relationship on the transaction price of housing under the condition of incomplete information.Based on the assumption that homebuyers are not sure about housing prices and the rationality of homebuyers, it uses robust optimization techniques And evolutionary game theory “replication dynamics ”, the concept of robust evolutionary game equilibrium is proposed, the corresponding replication dynamic system is established, and the asymptotic stability of robust evolutionary equilibrium of the system is analyzed, and the demand and supply of supply and demand in different markets Case, the general law of price strategy evolution of homebuyers.Finally, numerical examples are used to verify the model.
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