针对环境规制中中央政府与地方政府之间的委托代理关系,通过构建多任务委托-代理模型,给出了中央政府激励地方政府的最优契约形式,考察了最优激励契约设计的影响因素,着重分析了环境规制相关因素对最优激励契约的影响。研究结果表明,中央政府对经济增长的重视度、中央政府对环境质量的重视度、地方政府的风险偏好、地方政府的经济发展能力、经济增长方差、污染减排量方差、环境规制执行成本以及环境规制经济成本都会影响最优激励契约的确立。中央政府应根据自身对经济增长和环境质量的重视程度,结合地方政府的不同属性,确立或调整最优激励方案。 Aiming at the principal-agent relationship between central government and local government in environmental regulation, this paper gives the optimal contract form for central government to encourage local government and constructs the multitasking principal-agent model, examines the influencing factors of optimal incentive contract design, Focus on the analysis of the impact of environmental regulatory factors on the optimal incentive contract. The results show that the emphasis of the central government on economic growth, the central government’s emphasis on environmental quality, the local government’s risk appetite, the ability of local governments to develop their economy, the variance of economic growth, the variance of emission reduction, the cost of implementing environmental regulation and Environmental regulation economic costs will affect the establishment of the optimal incentive contract. The central government should establish or adjust the optimal incentive plan according to its own emphasis on economic growth and environmental quality and in combination with the different attributes of local governments.