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研究由单制造商和单零售商组成的双渠道供应链系统在非对称的生产成本扰动信息下的契约设计问题.使用委托代理理论,通过求解零售商优化问题的Kuhn-Tucker条件,给出了非对称的生产成本扰动信息下的双渠道供应链的最优契约,并且分析了非对称成本扰动信息对于双渠道供应链定价决策、生产数量决策及供应链成员利润和整个系统性能的影响.研究表明,当生产成本扰动满足一定条件时,初始的生产计划仍然是最优的;制造商私有成本扰动信息不一定会给系统带来利润损失,并且明确给出了未造成利润损失的边界条件.
This paper studies the contract design problem under the asymmetric production cost disturbance information of a dual-channel supply chain system composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer.Using the principal-agent theory, the Kuhn-Tucker condition for the retailer optimization problem is given Asymmetric cost of production perturbation under the information of the two-channel supply chain optimal contract, and analysis of asymmetric cost-disturbance information on the two-channel supply chain pricing decisions, the number of production decisions and the profitability of the supply chain members and the overall system performance. It shows that when the production cost perturbation satisfies certain conditions, the initial production plan is still optimal. The manufacturing cost disturbance information will not necessarily bring loss of profit to the system, and the boundary condition without loss of profit is clearly given.