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JAPANESE Prime Minister Shinzo Abe paid homage on December 26， 2013 to the Yasukuni Shrine， so further imperiling the already fragile security situation in East Asia. Abe later told media representatives that the purpose of his visit was to report to deceased ancestors on the government’s performance over the past year， state his resolve to carry out reforms， and pledge that Japan “will never go to war again.”These pretexts do not condone this amoral and provocative deed； they simply confirm Abe’s erroneous view， as a right-wing politician， of Japan’s historical aggression during WWII. Moreover， in disregarding the strong objections from China and South Korea to such visits Abe has once again incited emotional antagonism among the relevant East Asian nations. In the long term， fomenting nationalistic pride through indoctrination of delusional historical concepts of the so-called “brilliant conduct” of Japanese militarism during WWII will inevitably threaten Asia’s stability and prosperity， and global security as a whole.
Yasukuni Shrine： Nationalistic Symbol or Spiritual Instrument of Militarism？
As the foremost altar of Shintoism， the Yasukuni Shrine has been the medium through which to publicize and exalt Japan’s emperor-centered national polity. The shrine venerates the act of dying for the country as equal to sacrificing one’s life for the emperor of Japan – a sovereign honor. Japanese militarism before and during WWII originated in the adulation of the emperor and extreme nationalism that empowered Japan’s “departure from Asia for Europe” after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. The rise of militarism in the 1920s epitomized Japan’s emperor-centered national polity. Marginalization of the civil government due to ineffectual handling of foreign affairs embodied the Japanese military’s sacred pledge of loyalty to the emperor and the nation. Emulating the Samurai spirit with a military regime and intensified military forces was thus perceived as the sole path towards subjugating the Western powers. This militarism comprised the trinity of Japan’s emperor-centered national polity， absolutism and fascism. A fundamental manifestation of the people’s blind loyalty to the emperor and the nation， it rationalized Japan’s expansionism and aggression as essential to accomplishing the ultimate goal of a Japanese empire.
As Professor Tetsuya Takahashi of the University of Tokyo pointed out in his bestselling book Yasukuni Mondai （2005），“The Yasukuni Shrine is an ideological and religious device to mobilize the people for war.” In revering soldiers that “die for the country in battles for the emperor，” it enshrines them as holy martyrs. Tetsuya asserts that the emperor’s visit there during WWII and those of Japanese prime ministers after it ended were in the spirit wherein “a noble， holy war bears no blame.”The Yasukuni Shrine thus constitutes an “emotional alchemy” that exalts the nation and distorts history. It thus acted as a spiritual stimulus for Japan’s militarism through to the end of WWII. Cold War-Motivated Preservation
When WWII ended， General Douglas MacArthur –then Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers （SCAP）– set out to dismantle the Yasukuni Shrine and so root out militarism in Japan. But the Cold War and Korean War that erupted soon after WWII caused a change of attitude among SCAP leaders. They maintained that allowing Japan spiritual solace would help the nation recover from war. It could then become an important aide in the U.S.’s confrontation of socialist powers in East Asia， as represented by the Soviet Union. U.S. acquiescence thus upheld the shrine， albeit independent of the Japanese government， in accordance with Japan’s post-war constitution that the church be separate from the state. In her book The Chrysanthemum and the Sword that depicts and analyzes the specific characteristics of Japanese people and society， American anthropologist Ruth Benedict holds that preserving Japan’s spiritual world and belief system assured the U.S. of effective postwar governance in Japan. Sanctioning the Yasukuni Shrine’s existence nonetheless preserved this spiritual embodiment of Japanese nationalism. In 1979， the memorial tablets of 14 Class-A war criminals were moved there for enshrinement alongside the historically revered war dead. With help from the War-Bereaved Families Association， therefore， Yasukuni resurged as a sacred bastion of Japanese nationalism.
Guarding Against a Militaristic Revival
Democratic reforms after World War II that made the Japanese Emperor nominal head of state thus negated Japan’s emperor-centered national polity. But they in no way rooted out the country’s fanatical nationalism. Japan’s political and social structure is apparent in the people’s herd mentality， uniform social behavior and lax political participation that is in such sharp contrast with that of other democratic nations. Japanese politicians’choices， therefore， have decisive influence on people’s mentality and outlook. Moreover， Japan’s upward prosperous momentum in the 1970s and 1980s gave way at the end of the Cold War to long-term economic stagnation. A feeling of depression pervaded the country as a result of economic downturn， low birth rate and an aging society. Against this backdrop， “plucky” politicians gained popularity. Junichiro Koizumi， in office from 2001 to 2006， was the longest-serving Japanese Prime Minister in the post-cold war period. This achievement was largely attributable to his regular visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and persistent rejection of the “atonement diplomacy” towards China. Abe’s campaign in October 2012 to lead the LDP was under the banner of Junichiro Koizumi. Abe publicly declared his regret at not having visited the Yasukuni Shrine during his first term in office in 2006， and swore to go there if re-elected. The second Abe cabinet was installed on December 26， 2012. Upon taking office， Abe set about promoting his revisionist historical ideology. He categorically denied the sexual abuse of so-called“comfort women” during World War II， and also Japan’s aggression， claiming that the UN had yet to accurately define this term. Abe furthermore rejected the Murayama Danwa， a war apology statement by then Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama in 1995. He also declared that he would deny then Chief Cabinet Secretary Yōhei Kōno’s apology statement of 1993 on the “comfort women” issue.
Abe’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine differ in nature from those of Junichiro Koizumi. The latter’s annual visits during his six years in office were partly attributable to nostalgia for the militarist era， but mainly to personal political ambitions. Having no support from strong factions， he frequently visited the shrine， so calculatedly intensifying Sino-Japanese disputes to create the image of a “tough guy” and win more votes. Koizumi finally got his wish and became the most influential figure in the LDP. Abe， however， does not uphold conservative rightwing ideology as a matter of personal belief. His intent is rather to mobilize the Japanese people into supporting his government by intensifying and prolonging bilateral conflicts. He thus expects to accumulate sufficient political capital to carry out domestic economic reforms. Paying homage to enshrined war criminals， moreover， effectively condones Japan’s history of aggression. Abe at the same time hypes the “China threat，” using it as an excuse to revise Japan’s so-called pacifist constitution to allow Japan the right to collective self-defense， military expansion and war preparation.
In paying homage to the Yasukuni Shrine， so negating the post-war institution of diplomacy and national defense， Japan distinguishes itself as a nation with the resolve and capacity to confront China. It is hence more dangerous than ever.
Junichiro Koizumi often quoted the maxim “the deceased command respect” – a sentiment that signifies a cultural phenomenon in East Asia – in defense of his controversial visits to the Yasukuni shrine. Abe， however， makes no secret of his revisionism with respect to Japan’s history of aggression. This drive towards military expansion and war preparations rubs salt into the wounds of Asian victims of Japanese aggression and sexual slavery. It also edges Japan dangerously close to a militaristic revival. The recent row over An Jung-geun is the latest example of the Abe government’s denial of historical fact. On January 19， 2014， China established a memorial hall for Korean independence activist An Jung-geun， who in 1909 assassinated Ito Hirobumi， four-time Japanese Prime Minister and former ResidentGeneral of Korea. The hall is in Harbin Railway Station， where the assassination took place. Yoshihide Suga， Chief Cabinet Secretary of the Abe government， insists that An Jung-geun was a “terrorist” and a “criminal.” His comments confuse right and wrong by besmirching the heroic act of fighting aggression in the interests of freedom and national independence. Similar obfuscation is apparent in Japan’s territorial disputes with China， South Korea and Russia. The Abe government does not acknowledge the Sino-Japanese territorial controversy over the Diaoyu Islands， thus denying reality. It hence declines to hold bilateral dialogues with China that might resolve the issue. Japan has moreover revised middle school textbooks to inculcate in schoolchildren the idea that the Diaoyu Islands are Japanese territory， so exacerbating the deteriorating bilateral relationship. The ruling LDP also recently removed the oath“Japan will never again go to war” from the party’s 2014 action guideline. In his 2014 New Year speech Abe said， with regard to international criticism of his visits to the Yasukuni shrine， “the journey towards the return of a strong Japan is just beginning.” This blatantly provocative statement and the political shift towards military expansion that it implies highlights the Abe government as a source of security tension in East Asia.
Lastly， Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine countermanded the international justice meted out at the Tokyo trials that convicted Japanese war criminals. He thus garbled the historical fact of non-aggression versus aggression and closed the door to dialogue on SinoJapanese relations. China and Japan， the two giants of Asia， have consequently taken opposing stances. This will deal a heavy blow to regional economic cooperation and development， not to mention regional stability and security.
Which road will Japan take？ We can only wait and see. In any event， Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine casts a dark shadow on the future of Asia as a whole.
Yasukuni Shrine： Nationalistic Symbol or Spiritual Instrument of Militarism？
As the foremost altar of Shintoism， the Yasukuni Shrine has been the medium through which to publicize and exalt Japan’s emperor-centered national polity. The shrine venerates the act of dying for the country as equal to sacrificing one’s life for the emperor of Japan – a sovereign honor. Japanese militarism before and during WWII originated in the adulation of the emperor and extreme nationalism that empowered Japan’s “departure from Asia for Europe” after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. The rise of militarism in the 1920s epitomized Japan’s emperor-centered national polity. Marginalization of the civil government due to ineffectual handling of foreign affairs embodied the Japanese military’s sacred pledge of loyalty to the emperor and the nation. Emulating the Samurai spirit with a military regime and intensified military forces was thus perceived as the sole path towards subjugating the Western powers. This militarism comprised the trinity of Japan’s emperor-centered national polity， absolutism and fascism. A fundamental manifestation of the people’s blind loyalty to the emperor and the nation， it rationalized Japan’s expansionism and aggression as essential to accomplishing the ultimate goal of a Japanese empire.
As Professor Tetsuya Takahashi of the University of Tokyo pointed out in his bestselling book Yasukuni Mondai （2005），“The Yasukuni Shrine is an ideological and religious device to mobilize the people for war.” In revering soldiers that “die for the country in battles for the emperor，” it enshrines them as holy martyrs. Tetsuya asserts that the emperor’s visit there during WWII and those of Japanese prime ministers after it ended were in the spirit wherein “a noble， holy war bears no blame.”The Yasukuni Shrine thus constitutes an “emotional alchemy” that exalts the nation and distorts history. It thus acted as a spiritual stimulus for Japan’s militarism through to the end of WWII. Cold War-Motivated Preservation
When WWII ended， General Douglas MacArthur –then Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers （SCAP）– set out to dismantle the Yasukuni Shrine and so root out militarism in Japan. But the Cold War and Korean War that erupted soon after WWII caused a change of attitude among SCAP leaders. They maintained that allowing Japan spiritual solace would help the nation recover from war. It could then become an important aide in the U.S.’s confrontation of socialist powers in East Asia， as represented by the Soviet Union. U.S. acquiescence thus upheld the shrine， albeit independent of the Japanese government， in accordance with Japan’s post-war constitution that the church be separate from the state. In her book The Chrysanthemum and the Sword that depicts and analyzes the specific characteristics of Japanese people and society， American anthropologist Ruth Benedict holds that preserving Japan’s spiritual world and belief system assured the U.S. of effective postwar governance in Japan. Sanctioning the Yasukuni Shrine’s existence nonetheless preserved this spiritual embodiment of Japanese nationalism. In 1979， the memorial tablets of 14 Class-A war criminals were moved there for enshrinement alongside the historically revered war dead. With help from the War-Bereaved Families Association， therefore， Yasukuni resurged as a sacred bastion of Japanese nationalism.
Guarding Against a Militaristic Revival
Democratic reforms after World War II that made the Japanese Emperor nominal head of state thus negated Japan’s emperor-centered national polity. But they in no way rooted out the country’s fanatical nationalism. Japan’s political and social structure is apparent in the people’s herd mentality， uniform social behavior and lax political participation that is in such sharp contrast with that of other democratic nations. Japanese politicians’choices， therefore， have decisive influence on people’s mentality and outlook. Moreover， Japan’s upward prosperous momentum in the 1970s and 1980s gave way at the end of the Cold War to long-term economic stagnation. A feeling of depression pervaded the country as a result of economic downturn， low birth rate and an aging society. Against this backdrop， “plucky” politicians gained popularity. Junichiro Koizumi， in office from 2001 to 2006， was the longest-serving Japanese Prime Minister in the post-cold war period. This achievement was largely attributable to his regular visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and persistent rejection of the “atonement diplomacy” towards China. Abe’s campaign in October 2012 to lead the LDP was under the banner of Junichiro Koizumi. Abe publicly declared his regret at not having visited the Yasukuni Shrine during his first term in office in 2006， and swore to go there if re-elected. The second Abe cabinet was installed on December 26， 2012. Upon taking office， Abe set about promoting his revisionist historical ideology. He categorically denied the sexual abuse of so-called“comfort women” during World War II， and also Japan’s aggression， claiming that the UN had yet to accurately define this term. Abe furthermore rejected the Murayama Danwa， a war apology statement by then Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama in 1995. He also declared that he would deny then Chief Cabinet Secretary Yōhei Kōno’s apology statement of 1993 on the “comfort women” issue.
Abe’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine differ in nature from those of Junichiro Koizumi. The latter’s annual visits during his six years in office were partly attributable to nostalgia for the militarist era， but mainly to personal political ambitions. Having no support from strong factions， he frequently visited the shrine， so calculatedly intensifying Sino-Japanese disputes to create the image of a “tough guy” and win more votes. Koizumi finally got his wish and became the most influential figure in the LDP. Abe， however， does not uphold conservative rightwing ideology as a matter of personal belief. His intent is rather to mobilize the Japanese people into supporting his government by intensifying and prolonging bilateral conflicts. He thus expects to accumulate sufficient political capital to carry out domestic economic reforms. Paying homage to enshrined war criminals， moreover， effectively condones Japan’s history of aggression. Abe at the same time hypes the “China threat，” using it as an excuse to revise Japan’s so-called pacifist constitution to allow Japan the right to collective self-defense， military expansion and war preparation.
In paying homage to the Yasukuni Shrine， so negating the post-war institution of diplomacy and national defense， Japan distinguishes itself as a nation with the resolve and capacity to confront China. It is hence more dangerous than ever.
Junichiro Koizumi often quoted the maxim “the deceased command respect” – a sentiment that signifies a cultural phenomenon in East Asia – in defense of his controversial visits to the Yasukuni shrine. Abe， however， makes no secret of his revisionism with respect to Japan’s history of aggression. This drive towards military expansion and war preparations rubs salt into the wounds of Asian victims of Japanese aggression and sexual slavery. It also edges Japan dangerously close to a militaristic revival. The recent row over An Jung-geun is the latest example of the Abe government’s denial of historical fact. On January 19， 2014， China established a memorial hall for Korean independence activist An Jung-geun， who in 1909 assassinated Ito Hirobumi， four-time Japanese Prime Minister and former ResidentGeneral of Korea. The hall is in Harbin Railway Station， where the assassination took place. Yoshihide Suga， Chief Cabinet Secretary of the Abe government， insists that An Jung-geun was a “terrorist” and a “criminal.” His comments confuse right and wrong by besmirching the heroic act of fighting aggression in the interests of freedom and national independence. Similar obfuscation is apparent in Japan’s territorial disputes with China， South Korea and Russia. The Abe government does not acknowledge the Sino-Japanese territorial controversy over the Diaoyu Islands， thus denying reality. It hence declines to hold bilateral dialogues with China that might resolve the issue. Japan has moreover revised middle school textbooks to inculcate in schoolchildren the idea that the Diaoyu Islands are Japanese territory， so exacerbating the deteriorating bilateral relationship. The ruling LDP also recently removed the oath“Japan will never again go to war” from the party’s 2014 action guideline. In his 2014 New Year speech Abe said， with regard to international criticism of his visits to the Yasukuni shrine， “the journey towards the return of a strong Japan is just beginning.” This blatantly provocative statement and the political shift towards military expansion that it implies highlights the Abe government as a source of security tension in East Asia.
Lastly， Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine countermanded the international justice meted out at the Tokyo trials that convicted Japanese war criminals. He thus garbled the historical fact of non-aggression versus aggression and closed the door to dialogue on SinoJapanese relations. China and Japan， the two giants of Asia， have consequently taken opposing stances. This will deal a heavy blow to regional economic cooperation and development， not to mention regional stability and security.
Which road will Japan take？ We can only wait and see. In any event， Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine casts a dark shadow on the future of Asia as a whole.