论文部分内容阅读
对法律缺失状况下中国股票市场运行机制的研究指出,在遴选上市企业阶段,中央政府对上市资源的管制和地方政府的政治竞标赛相互作用,使得政府管制代替法律起到了保护投资者的作用。本文讨论配额制的运行过程后指出它实际是一种多层代理机制,需要通过分析地方政府和企业之间的互动来确定配额制在保护投资者中所起到的作用。本文运用信号博弈模型对这一过程进行分析,指出在地方政府不确定企业经营状况时,配额制使得合格企业都会申请上市,部分不合格企业不申请上市,从而在一定程度上提高了上市企业治理,保护了投资者。本文还讨论了配额制退出的原因和地方政府治理水平提高对配额制的影响。
The research on the operating mechanism of China’s stock market under the absence of law shows that the control of listed resources by the central government and the political competition of local governments during the process of selecting listed companies make government regulation instead of law play an investor protection role. After discussing the running process of quota system, this paper points out that it is actually a multi-layer agency mechanism and needs to determine the role of quota system in investor protection by analyzing the interaction between local governments and enterprises. This paper uses the signal game model to analyze this process and points out that when the local government is uncertain about the business conditions, the quota system makes the qualified enterprises apply for listing, and some unqualified enterprises do not apply for listing, which improves the governance of listed enterprises to a certain extent , Protecting investors. This article also discusses the reasons for the withdrawal of the quota system and the impact of the improvement of the governance level of local governments on the quota system.