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结党贪污是帝制时代官僚政治体制的产物,其特点是不容易被察觉,即使察觉了也很难受到法律制裁。在某些特殊的情况下,君主为了自身的利益和封建国家的安全,对臣下纳赂行贿并不在乎。只要帝王利用官僚集团,那就一定还会有贪污这种特殊的再分配形式。虽然贪污纳贿是中古社会的常见现象,但没有结成派别的贪官的危害性相对来说比较小,其贪污的数量也较为有限。一旦形成贪墨利益集团,不仅会严重地败坏吏治,而且还是社会致乱之源,是导致中国历史难以摆脱周期律的重要原因之一。
Corruption by the party is a product of the bureaucratic political system of the imperial era. Its characteristics are not easily noticeable and difficult to find legal sanctions even if it is detected. In some special cases, the monarch did not care about accepting bribes for his own interests and for the security of the feudal nation. As long as the emperor uses bureaucratic groups, there must have been a special form of redistribution of corruption. Although corruption and bribery are common in medieval society, corrupt officials without a faction are relatively less harmful and have a relatively limited amount of corruption. Once the embezzled interest groups are formed, not only will they seriously ruin the official administration, but they will also be the source of social disorder, which is one of the important reasons that make it difficult for Chinese history to get rid of the periodic law.