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Using a sample of 1486 Chinese A-share listed companies for the period 2004-2008,this study empirically tests the impact of family control,institutional environment and their interaction on the cash dividend policy of listed companies.Our results indicate that(1)family firms have a lower cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends than non-family firms;(2) a favorable regional institutional environment has a significant positive impact on the cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends of listed companies;and(3) the impact of the regional institutional environment on cash dividends is stronger in family firms than in non-family firms.Somewhat surprisingly,we find that controlling family shareholders in China may intensify Agency Problem Ⅰ(the owner-manager conflict) rather than Agency Problem Ⅱ(the controlling shareholder-minority shareholder conflict),and thus have a significant negative impact on cash dividend policy.In contrast,a favorable regional institutional environment plays a positive corporate governance role in mitigating Agency Problem 1 and encouraging family firms to pay cash dividends.
Using a sample of 1486 Chinese A-share listed companies for the period 2004-2008, this study empirically tests the impact of family control, institutional environment and their interaction on the cash dividend policy of listed companies. Our results indicate that (1) family (2) a favorable regional institutional environment has a significant positive impact on the cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends of listed companies; and (3 ) the impact of the regional institutional environment on cash dividends is stronger in family firms than in non-family firms. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that controlling family shareholders in China rather intensify Agency Problem Ⅰ (the owner-manager conflict) rather than Agency Problem The controlling shareholder-minority shareholder conflict, and thus have a significant negative impact on cash dividend policy institutional environment plays a positive corporate governance role in mitigating agency problem 1 and encouraging family firms to pay cash dividends.