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股权分置导致流通股股东和非流通股股东的利益发生冲突,割裂了大股东财富增长的正向激励机制,加重了大股东的利益输送行为。股权分置改革的顺利实施将实现所有股份的全流通,使大小股东的利益趋于一致,对于我国证券市场来说是一次重大的制度性变革。那么,股权分置改革的成效究竟如何?采用2003-2008年在沪深股市进行交易的A股上市公司为样本,从金字塔股权结构下终极控制者的视角出发,设置股权分置改革虚拟变量,利用面板数据对股权分置改革和公司绩效进行检验后发现,股权分置改革确实提高了上市公司的经营业绩,并影响了终极控制者的行为,使其利益取向回归于公司价值本身。
The division of ownership led to the conflict between the interests of tradable shareholders and non-tradable shareholders, which cut off the positive incentive mechanism of large shareholders’ wealth growth and aggravated the transfer of interests of major shareholders. The successful implementation of the split share structure reform will achieve full circulation of all the shares and bring the interests of both large and small shareholders into line with each other. This is a major institutional change for the securities market in China. Then, what is the effect of non-tradable share reform? Using the A-share listed companies traded in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2003 to 2008 as a sample, from the perspective of the ultimate controller of the pyramid ownership structure, set up the dummy variables of the non-tradable share reform, Using the panel data to test the split share structure reform and corporate performance, we find that the split share structure reform does improve the operating performance of listed companies and affects the ultimate controller’s behavior, and returns the interest orientation to the company value itself.