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本文基于债权人视角考察企业避税行为的经济后果。利用2001-2014年我国A股上市公司的数据进行研究发现,企业避税行为伴随着更高的银行贷款成本,以及更短的贷款期限,即使经过一系列稳健性检验后,本文的结论依然成立。这说明,我国商业银行能够识别企业避税行为,相应地提高了避税企业的融资成本。进一步的研究显示,企业避税对银行贷款成本的影响随债权人与最终控制人利益协调性的提高而降低,随公司信息不透明度的提高而增强。因而,企业避税潜在的代理成本是影响银行信贷的重要因素,支持了委托代理框架下企业避税的相关理论。本文的研究结论有助于理解企业避税行为的经济后果,同时也有助于理解商业银行的信贷机制。
This article examines the economic consequences of corporate tax avoidance from the perspective of creditors. Using the data of A-share listed companies in our country from 2001 to 2014, we find that corporate tax avoidance is associated with higher bank loan costs and shorter loan maturity. The conclusion of this paper is still valid even after a series of robust tests. This shows that our country’s commercial banks can identify the tax avoidance behavior of enterprises, which in turn increases the financing cost of tax avoidance enterprises. Further research shows that the impact of corporate tax avoidance on the bank loan costs decreases with the improvement of the coordination between creditors and the ultimate controller, and increases with the increase of the company’s information transparency. Therefore, the potential agency cost of corporate tax avoidance is an important factor that affects bank credit, and supports the theory of corporate tax avoidance under the framework of principal-agent. The conclusions of this study help to understand the economic consequences of tax avoidance, but also help to understand the credit mechanism of commercial banks.