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文中针对生产性服务外包合作中的双边道德风险问题,在策略合作模式下,建立了生产性服务外包收益分配机制,并通过数学推导得出结论。研究结果表明,在策略型合作模式下,生产性服务供应商获得的最优收益分配系数与外包项目的价值系数、双方的努力水平和成本系数无关,但和制造企业的努力水平的产出系数负相关,和生产性服务供应商努力水平的产出系数正相关;服务供应商开始获得的固定支付一定小于其保留效用,生产性服务供应商必须努力工作才能获得更多的收益,并在此基础上规避其道德风险;最优固定支付与双方的成本系数正相关,与生产性服务外包项目的价值系数负相关。
Aiming at the problem of bilateral moral hazard in the PSO cooperation, this paper establishes the mechanism of PEO profit distribution under strategic cooperation mode and draws the conclusion through mathematical deduction. The results show that in strategic cooperation mode, the optimal profit distribution coefficient obtained by producer service providers has nothing to do with the value coefficient of outsourcing projects, the level of effort and the cost coefficient of the two parties, but the output coefficient Negative correlations are positively correlated with the level of productivity of producer service providers; the fixed payments that service providers begin to receive must be less than their retained utility, and producer service providers must work hard to get more profit, Based on the avoidance of moral hazard; the optimal fixed payment is positively correlated with the cost coefficient of both parties and negatively correlated with the value coefficient of the producer service outsourcing project.