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本文针对监事会监督不力,在上市公司内部毫无作为的现象,以被证监会处罚的公司为研究对象,从现有的制度安排进行分析。分析发现,现有的制度安排本身并没有对监事会寄予很高的期望,监事会流于形式在所难免。本文分析的意义在于:监事会消极履职除本身独立性、激励机制等因素影响所致以外,与外部制度安排也有重要关系,有效的制度安排及其执行才是监事会发挥积极作用的治本之举。
This paper aims at the ineffective supervision of the board of supervisors and the inaction of listed companies. Taking the companies punished by the CSRC as the research objects, this article analyzes from the existing institutional arrangements. The analysis found that the existing institutional arrangement itself did not place high expectations on the board of supervisors, and the supervisory board was inevitable. The significance of this paper lies in the following aspects: The negative performance of the board of supervisors is also related to the external institutional arrangements, except for its own independence and incentive mechanism. Effective institutional arrangements and their implementation are the only way for the board of supervisors to play an active role.