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研究由一个制造商与两个竞争零售商组成的两级供应链系统的最优决策及契约协调问题,其中每个零售商面临的需求是价格敏感和随机的.当随机需求分布具有递增失败率(IFR)时,竞争的零售商存在唯一最优的定价和订购决策,并给出了最优决策的解析表达式,证明了收益共享契约能使两个竞争零售商加盟的供应链达到协调及契约成立的条件.最后通过理论推导和数值分析给出了需求价格弹性系数对最优决策及协调的影响.
We study the optimal decision-making and contract coordination problem of a two-level supply chain system composed of one manufacturer and two competing retailers, in which each retailer’s demand is price-sensitive and stochastic.When the distribution of stochastic demand has an increasing failure rate (IFR), there exists a unique optimal pricing and ordering decision for the competing retailer, and an analytical expression of the optimal decision is given. It proves that the revenue sharing contract can make the supply chain of two competing retailers to be coordinated and The conditions of the contract are established.Finally, the effects of the price elasticity of demand on optimal decision-making and coordination are given through theoretical derivation and numerical analysis.