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International terrorism started a new trend in 2015， in which the “Islamic State” （IS） became the most dangerous international terrorist group with continually expanding cross-regional influence. IS has won massive submission and worship from a large number of terrorist groups as it successfully withstood the air strikes by the US and Russia， which finally affected the realignment， regrouping and strategic adjustment of the whole international terrorism. Meanwhile， the diversification of interest orientations of nations who participated in anti-terrorism cooperation led to the absence of joint efforts on international anti-terrorism cooperation. The prospects of international anti-terrorism cooperation thus will remain severe and complex in 2016.
IS Is Rising as the Most Dangerous International Terrorist Group
IS strengthened its status， influence and effect in international terrorist ideological trends and movements in 2015， and meanwhile was confronted with huge military pressures in the main battlefields in Syria and Iraq. The US-led coalition forces readjusted the air attack frequency according to their political needs， which made IS undergo not only supplies and equipment loss but also casualties of militants. At the request of Bashar al-Assad government， on September 30， 2015， Russia also started fierce airstrike targeting at the IS groups in Syria， enlarging the personnel， supplies and equipment loss of IS and annihilating a few key members of the terrorist activities.
To escape the airstrikes by the US and Russia， IS applied deft offense tactics to preserve its major force by proactively giving up a few “territory.” In Syria， IS focused on the defense of its “temporary capital” Al-Raqqah and kept the battle fields on the outer defense line of Idlib， Deir ez-Zor and Aleppo. It tried to avoid loss of its major force through forcing local people to fight as “human shields，” and in the way of various street battles and guerrilla wars. Meanwhile it decentralized the major force into small groups and then concentrated all the decentralized forces intermittently， thus to launch seesaw battles with Syrian government forces and maintain the status of a strategic stalemate. In Iraq， IS occupied and dwelled in several large- and medium-sized cities as Mosul， shortly seized Ramadi， capital of Anbar province in “Sunni Triangle” though it withdrew proactively in the end of 2015， made tactical advance in Fallujah， Baqubah and some other cities， and continued its peripheral penetration to Bagdad. In the main battlefields in Syria and Iraq， relying on the strong air cover of the US and Russia， both countries’ government forces took the advantage of their heavy equipment in ground fire and launched counterattacks in some regions. Based on these advantages and IS’ systematical strategic contraction to reduce casualty in sparsely populated areas， the government forces retook more than 20，000 square kilometers lost ground， which made the “territory” of IS only 240，000 square kilometers， nearly the same size of the UK. However， the two governments performed quite differently in attack and defense transition situation in the battle with IS： the Syrian government force has taken offensive attack from the former defensive situation while the Iraqi government force has lost a few key cities for several times and suffered large casualties when it confronted with insistent recalcitrant counter fire of IS on multiple fronts.
To alleviate the pressure in the main battlefields， IS started trans-continental expansion under the flags of “Transforming the Islamic World” and “Conquering the Infidels.” Firstly， on the problem of supply difficulty after the airstrike by the US and Russia， IS re-integrated its remaining force in the main battlefields in Syria and Iraq， cut down “redundant personnel” including the “Foreign Jihadists” from the Arab World， South Asia， Southeast Asia， West and East Africa， Central Asia， Transcaucasia， Europe and the US， and encouraged them to return to their home countries to spread the “jihadist fire，” establish peripheral branches， “consciously and actively ”fight against the interests of Europe and the US， and some other secular or atheism regimes， and punish those pagans and non-believers according to the geographic， time and other local conditions. Secondly， IS called for the terrorist groups above to “swear allegiance” and promise high posts and other favors such as “ligancy” to them. These two measures achieved significant success， which made IS’ fierce trans-continental expansion keep in an extreme favorable status.
After IS established its Libyan branch， the Egyptian group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis （Supporters of Jerusalem） joined IS， and the Abu Sayyaf Jihadist Group in the Philippines took the oath of allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2014， IS successively announced a few Muslim countries or regions， including Egypt， Saudi Arabia， Yemen， Algeria， Afghanistan， Pakistan， Nigeria， Chechnya and Dagestan to be its “wilayah”（namely province） from the beginning of 2015， and even appointed “Chief Executives” or “Emir” （namely commander） in these regions. Meanwhile， terrorist groups（or a part of them） from over 10 countries， such as Boko Haram in Nigeria， several branches of Al-Shabbaab of Somali， Ansar al-Shari’a （Supporters of Shari’a Law） in Yemen and Libya， and external wings of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan（IMU）， swore allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In term of its hazards， IS launched systemic large-scale massacres towards the Shias， Yazidis， Kurds， prisoners from government forces and foreigners in the main battlefields in Syria and Iraq， which took the lives of tens of thousands. For instance， according to the communiqué published by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq （UNAMI） on January 1st， 2016， 7，515 individuals died and 14，855 individuals were wounded in the terrorist activities only in Iraq in 2015， which was mainly caused by IS. Out of fear， millions of Syrian citizens fled away as refugees from the regions controlled by IS， as the armed force of IS committed all kinds of crimes in every land they appeared， such as looting banks and shops， raping， kidnapping， destroying non-Islamic historical sites and heritages of human civilization， ruining numbers of cities and towns and damaging livelihood facilities. Not only in Syria and Iraq， IS also committed a lot of terrorist activities in external regions， such as “Islamic Jihad” in countries and regions like Yemen， Egypt， Libya， Tunisia， Europe and the US. Among these activities， the most influential incidents included Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks in France， Sousse Hotel attacks in Tunis， series of terrorist attacks in Paris， terrorist shootings in California， etc. Meanwhile， out of worship， some terrorist groups who swore allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi also committed numbers of appalling terrorist attacks， such as Kenyan Moi University terrorist shooting committed by al-Shabaab， Bamako Hotel attack in Mali committed by al-Mourabitoun. IS is now generally recognized as the most dangerous terrorist group in the world， as it planned to establish a “Worldwide Caliphate，” widely spread its “Jihadi-Salafism” ideology and doctrines to numbers of countries， and committed numbers of terrorist activities.
The Realignment， Regrouping and Strategic Adjustment of International Terrorism
The rapid rise of IS led to a kind of “spillover effect” in Middle East， North， West and East Africa， South Asia， Southeast Asia， Transcaucasia and some other regions， which triggered the realignment， regrouping and strategic adjustment of the international terrorism as follows：
IS and al-Qaeda are contending for the leadership of global terrorist ideology and movement， in which the influence of the former one is exceeding the latter one
On June 29， 2014， Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi， the head of IS， made the speech of Declaration of Caliphate in Mosul， northern Iraq， in which he criticized that al-Qaeda under the fatuous governance of Ayman al-Zawahiri only lived off the legacy of 9.11 Attack， attempted and accomplished nothing in the past 10 years， and boasted of its few efforts on expanding the “Islamic Jihadi，” which had made it lose the credibility and qualification of “building a new world” through “Islamic Jihadi.” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared that， with the establishment of “Islamic Caliphate，” he， as the Caliph， would lead all the devout Muslims to fight for “the worldwide converts to Islam，” as “this glorious mission has historically fell on the shoulder of Ibrahim （one epithet of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi） and his jurist team of Islamic law.” At the same time， Ayman al-Zawahiri， the head of al-Qaeda， also made a few speeches to refute that， the political and religious behaviors of IS under the autocracy of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi were over bloody and cruel that it harmed the image and moral basis of “Islamic Jihadi” and misled the devout Muslims， as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi distorted the Islamic law. Ayman al-Zawahiri reminded all the supporters of “Islamic Jihadi” not to be deceived by al-Baghdadi and the only correct choice was to unite under the leadership of al-Qaeda. The two leaders just stuck to their own argument and denied each other. Under this situation， terrorist groups in Middle East， North， West and East Africa， South Asia， Southeast Asia， Transcaucasia and some other regions had to decide which side to follow. Generally speaking， in term of overall terrorist force distribution， most of them supported IS in the end. There are four reasons for this situation： Firstly， IS’ propaganda of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is the lineal descent by blood of Prophet Muhammad proved to be effective； secondly， the achievement of IS on “Islamic Jihadi” is indeed greater than al-Qaeda and its branches； thirdly， IS won large worship by terrorist groups through its success in withstanding the airstrikes by Russia and the US and destroying a large part of government force in the main battlefields in Syria and Iraq； fourthly， the amount of IS’ military payment and pension for martyrs to its followers is several times higher than al-Qaeda’s and its branches’. Al-Qaeda is faced with the bottleneck in the process of development， as it cannot take effective command and control over its branches
Since the Afghanistan War launched by the US in 2001， al-Qaeda has been struggling weakly on self-recovering and living space expansion. Al-Qaeda and its branches were demoralized after their leader Osama bin Laden was killed by US troops on May 1st， 2011. Al-Qaeda，was taken over by Ayman al-Zawahiri thereafter. Though years’ efforts， it still cannot reverse the demoralized trend. The main reasons are： firstly， al-Qaeda never gained its own “territory，” instead， it had to live under the protection of Afghanistan and Pakistan Taliban， and its expansion needs the permission of the two Taliban in advance； secondly， there are internal contradictions between Afghanistan and Pakistan Taliban on which the al-Qaeda cannot mediate， and furthermore Aymanal-Zawahiri will fall into an awkward predicament and even suffer from double pressures when Afghanistan and Pakistan Taliban request it to undertake the “obligation”； thirdly， as the rapid rising of terrorist groups like IS， al-Nusra Front， and Lashkar-e-Islam， they attract a large portion of “donation” from the main traditional sponsors of al-Qaeda， which makes al-Qaeda face financial embarrassment that it even cannot provide financial support for a large scale of terrorist activities； fourthly， the armed forces under al-Qaeda suffered from great casualties from the war， wound， disability， disease， cold weather and food shortage that they could not commit more terrorist actions directly. The result was that its weapons remained used and obsolete and its combat ability dropped since it could not seize new weapons， equipment and logistics supplies from battles any more， thus greatly reducing al-Qaeda’ effectiveness of political influence and external propaganda consequently. The religious and political authority of al-Qaeda was particularly doubted by its branches in “Arabian Peninsula，” Maghreb， Sinai and Somali when Ayman al-Zawahiri failed to arbitrate the disputes between IS and al-Nusra Front in February 2014. These branches even reached mutual understanding of cooperation to respect each other’s interest pursuit and “sphere of influence” with IS branches in Yemen， Saudi Arabia， Egypt， Libya， Algeria， Somali and some other countries. In contrast with IS’ openly denying attitude towards al-Qaeda Headquarters， the behaviors of al-Qaeda’s branches obviously indicate the failure of commanding of al-Qaeda Headquarters. Out of survival needs， some terrorist groups getting benefits from the competing both sides of IS and al-Qaeda as their supports
IS and al-Qaeda are now deeply rooted in many countries while numbers of medium-and small-sized terrorist groups still exist in their “spheres of influence.” Though IS and al-Qaeda both enjoy overwhelming power and influence among all the terrorist groups and share the similar pursuit of ideology and value with other groups， those medium- and small-sized terrorist groups are still unwilling to be tied together with battles of IS and al-Qaeda and even take precautions against the potential swallowing-up by the two giants. In order to achieve their own political goals preemptively and avoid causing unnecessary danger by offending the two giants， they explore several ways to survive under the “Jihad hegemony，” including providing “special talents” to both sides within the scope of their ability， paying “Jihad Tax” regularly， coordinating on military operations or assisting in tactical coordination， flattering the leaders of both sides， transferring part of the peripheral groups to “pledge allegiance” to both sides when they are under the great pressure. For instance， the East Turkistan Islamic Movement （ETIM） and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan （IMU）， two groups eluding between Afghanistan and Pakistan， once transferred “key military members” to al-Qaeda， and meanwhile expressed “worship and admiration” to IS through online video and even mobilized a part of terrorists to go to Syria to join IS when IS set the “Command of Front Line” and recruited followers in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Besides， when branches of al-Qaeda and IS competed on “localized-development” in Somali， al-Shabbaab arranged several peripheral groups subjected to IS while its main force still pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda Somali branch. Out of the need of competing for “sphere of influence，” both IS and al-Qaeda took comprehensive measures to allure and attract the allegiance of those medium-and small-sized terrorist groups.
Various terrorist groups adjusted their “Jihad Strategy” to meet the changes in external environment
The reasons behind this strategic adjustment wave include： the disorder of a few countries in West Asia and North Africa after more than five years’ turmoil and the overlaps of various new and old conflicts without any solution provide favorable place， time and the social basis for the development of terrorism； the heavy military pressure caused by the anti-terrorist airstrikes of the United States and Russia in Syria and Iraq forced these groups to adjust their strategies； countries as Pakistan， Afghanistan， Saudi Arabia， Egypt and Jordan exposed large security defense weaknesses and vulnerabilities though they has put more strengths on anti-terrorism in recent years； the warming-up of internal economic and social ethnic and religious conflicts in some South Asia and Southeast Asia countries leave more space for the development of terrorism. Generally speaking， the basic characteristics of the present external environment for terrorism are strategically favourable and tactically serious. Under this background， international terrorist groups made the following strategic adjustments：
Starting to learn the achievements in “theoretical innovation” from each other to guide their “Islamic Jihad.” Different versions of “Jihad Theory” now have made massive innovations and become inclusive and complementary to each other， though the two “Bellwether Groups” of international terrorist organizations （namely IS and al-Qaeda） denied each other while the medium-and small-sized terrorist groups also continually undermined each other’s development. The theories generally acknowledged by them include as follows： the demarcation of enemy and friend theory， resistance of violence theory， active attack theory， spiritual deterrence theory， avoiding enemy’s main forces and striking the weak point theory， eternal jihad theory， jihad phases theory， destined jihad victory theory， the Islamic pure society theory， etc. These theories， whose “correctness” and “effectiveness” had been proved by numbers of terrorist practices， are the ideological basis of terrorist groups’ strategy-making. As for strategic orientation， the major terrorist groups like IS， al-Qaeda and their branches， Al-Shabbaab and Boko Haram， particularly emphasize “controlling the main battlefield firmly” and “expanding in exterior regions.”
Imitating each others’ terrorist attack tactics for space expansion. International terrorist groups with different sizes are not state actors in the sense of international laws， and they are not able to initiate the conventional wars between the state actors from the perspective of hard power of military and war mobilization ability， though the “objectives of jihad” are state actors and citizens. These characteristics decide the asymmetry and dissimilation of terrorist violence methods and means towards state actors and citizens. With a view to increasing the efficiency and effect of terrorist activities， and keeping the strength of the groups， no matter whether IS and al-Qaeda， or medium-and small-sized international terrorist groups， they have all begun to learn and imitate each other’s terrorist attack tactics and it is possible to summarize some common routines， including： （1） trying to avoid fighting with government forces and special forces； （2） choosing densely populated areas like sports venues， transport hubs， concerts， squares， bars， nightclubs， mosques， campuses， stores and hospitals as attack sites； （3） taking civilians as “soft targets”； （4） taking actions at different sites at the same time； （5） committing serial shootings， car bombings， suicide bombings， airline hijackings and bombings， hostage-taking and beheadings， and bus passenger hijackings， poisoning drinking water， destroying power facilities and gas pipelines， and promoting the “localization” of terrorist activities； （6） encouraging “Lone Wolf” style terrorist activities； （7） expanding network effect through multimedia technology； （8） preaching “jihad” doctrines through Internet and recruiting “jihadists” globally， inciting brainwashed young people to initiate “jihadist” activities in different countries， etc. IS’ financial support approaches were imitated by other terrorist groups. The supply of financial resources is crucial to the sustainable development of various terrorist groups in the world. The raising ability of operation funds differentiates between various terrorist groups due to respective surviving and developing conditions. IS’ ostentatious financial resources raising ability and strength not only led to massive “envy” but also widened imitation by other terrorist groups. For example， based on its natural resources endowment in the so-called “Jihad Region，” Boko Haram in Nigeria is mining and smuggling oil illegally； ETIM， IMU and Haqqani Network are joining in drug transactions； groups as Hizb ut-Tahrir in Ferghana Valley are reselling antiques； and Islamic Emirate of Chechnya， Abu Sayyaf Jihadist Group in the Philippines and Ansar al-Shari’a in Libya are increasing the amount of Zakāt （Islamic Tax） in the region they controlled to support their terrorist activities.
Current Status and Prospect of International Anti-Terrorism Cooperation
The savage acts in Syria and Iraq， exterior expansion of IS and many other terrorist groups， not only posed huge threats to the ruling status of governments in Syria and Iraq， but also harmed the benefits of multiple countries and parties， which pushed these countries to wave flags of anti-terrorists and form various anti-terrorism alliances according to different consideration of self-interests. These alliances include the anti-IS alliance led by the US； anti-terrorism group composed by Russia， Iraq， Iran and Syria； and Muslim nations anti-terrorism alliance led by Saudi Arabia， aiming at casting all forms of fighting against the targets in Syria and Iraq， and exterior expansion regions controlled by IS and other terrorist groups. Despite that， the existing force of IS and other terrorist groups still put large strength on exterior expansion， since all the anti-terrorist alliance countries and parties are reluctant to work together as follows：
The US still treats terrorist groups such as IS as the main forces to overthrow the Bashar al-Assad regime and is not willing to destroy them thoroughly
To promote the regime change in Syria is the key part of the neo-interventionism carried out by the US in Middle East， which aims at cutting off the “Shia Crescent” centered around Iran to realize the democratic transformation of the whole Middle East. The US once put great expectations on opposition forces such as Syrian National Council and Free Syrian Army at the beginning when Arab Spring was spread to Syria and even started the enlargement and training plan of Free Syrian Army. However， as the Free Syrian Army was afraid to fight and the training plan was soon proved to be a failure， the US shifted its expectation on terrorist groups like IS to overthrow Bashar al-Assad’s regime， and assisted the opposition forces such as Syrian National Council and Free Syrian Army to take the rule， and finally instigated Western and regional alliances to destroy terrorist groups such as IS according to specific situation then. Reluctantly the US began to cast airstrikes on the targets of terrorist groups like IS in Syria and Iraq in August 2014， when IS and other terrorist groups rose rapidly and posed huge threats on the regimes of Iraq， Jordan and other countries from June 2014. Even though， the US does not completely give up the plan of making use of terrorist groups like IS to inflict heavy losses on the Bashar al-Assad regime. Saudi Arabia， Turkey and some other countries pushing for the overthrow of the Bashar al-Assad regime attempt to take advantage of IS to serve their geo-political interests
These countries never try to hide their obsessive desire and pursuit of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad’s regime， even do not change their original intentions when confronting terrorist threats themselves. In their views， it is Bashar al-Assad’s unwillingness to step down that led to the emerging of terrorist groups like IS， and consequently caused the humanitarian crisis and refugee wave in Syria. They believe these problems will not be solved until the Bashar al-Assad’s regime is overthrown. For the US， it tends to make use of terrorist groups like IS to achieve its goals when it found that these forces posed much larger threat on the Bashar al-Assad’s regime than the so-called moderate opposition groups like Free Syrian Army. Under the pressure of international public opinion， these countries joined the anti-IS airstrike alliance led by the US， dropped a few bombs symbolically and then attempted and accomplished nothing. As terrorist groups like IS having committed terrorist attacks in Europe and many other regions in the world， more and more countries including France， the UK， Germany and Belgium are tending to counter terrorism whole-heartedly and calling for a more efficient international anti-terrorism alliance. Hence officials of Saudi Arabia， Turkey and some other countries began to deny any collusion with terrorist groups like IS and showed that they would prohibit folk religious institutions and the rich providing financial support for these groups. However， in the regional agenda， Saudi Arabia， Turkey and some other regional countries prioritized the overthrowing of the Bashar al-Assad’s regime than striking IS and other terrorist groups.
Many countries fear to counter terrorism
Some Asian， African and European countries， including the countries which suffered a lot from the scourge of IS and other terrorist groups， are afraid to fight against these groups determinedly. Firstly， they dare not recognize terrorist forces like IS as international terrorist groups， out of the worry of bringing trouble and revenge home. Some of them even recognize terrorist forces like IS as “religious thought trend and movement with unremitting value pursuit，” and try to gain the favor of these groups by openly appreciating these groups’ slogan of “Destroying Israel.” Secondly， they are also too afraid of bringing revenge home to join the international anti-terrorism activities. “Double Standards” are restricting the strength of international anti-terrorism efforts
As far as international anti-terrorism struggle concerned， there are indeed some “Double Standards” in public opinion instigating and domestic and foreign policies follow-ups. With the aim of containing the rising of other great powers， some great powers interfere in the internal affairs of other great powers， including making use of ethnic， religious and other issues of those regarded as rival powers to boost their national secession. For example， some countries once criticized Russia’s anti-terrorism activities in Chechnya， as they believed Russia’s military activities on anti-terrorism violated the human rights of Chechnya Muslims and caused local humanitarian crisis， meanwhile they turned a blind eye to the huge harm caused by Chechnya terrorist groups to Russia’s national security and people’s lives. Another example， out of the consideration of hindering China’s peaceful development， and the divergence on political system， ideology and values， or the ethnic affection and religious mission， some countries publicly supported the terrorist activities of ETIM through various means and ways so as to disorder Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. They even embellished ETIM’s terrorist activities as “national self-determination movement，” distorted China’s ethnic and religious policies， and maligned China’s anti-terrorism activities and other legal activities to maintain stability in Xinjiang. The “Double Standards” of some countries are also demonstrated in that， they usually recognize other international actors’ behaviors and power growing as terrorism and terrorist groups according to the consideration of whether these behaviors or power growing will threaten their own interests and security actually or potentially.
Looking into 2016， the situation of international anti-terrorism will still be complex and serious， in which the structure of two major international terrorist forces as the centers will remain， and the terrorist groups including IS， al-Nusra Front， ETIM will remain confronting the global anti-terrorism forces. International society’s understanding of the harm of terrorism will also be further deepened. As the UN Security Council has recognized these groups as international terrorist groups， some countries may correct their views and recognition of IS， al-Nusra Front， ETIM and other terrorist groups. Consequently， more and more countries will join the international anti-terrorism efforts. Meanwhile， given that the economic， political and social ideological roots for terrorism and extremism cannot be eliminated in a short time， the international fight against terrorism will have a long march.
IS Is Rising as the Most Dangerous International Terrorist Group
IS strengthened its status， influence and effect in international terrorist ideological trends and movements in 2015， and meanwhile was confronted with huge military pressures in the main battlefields in Syria and Iraq. The US-led coalition forces readjusted the air attack frequency according to their political needs， which made IS undergo not only supplies and equipment loss but also casualties of militants. At the request of Bashar al-Assad government， on September 30， 2015， Russia also started fierce airstrike targeting at the IS groups in Syria， enlarging the personnel， supplies and equipment loss of IS and annihilating a few key members of the terrorist activities.
To escape the airstrikes by the US and Russia， IS applied deft offense tactics to preserve its major force by proactively giving up a few “territory.” In Syria， IS focused on the defense of its “temporary capital” Al-Raqqah and kept the battle fields on the outer defense line of Idlib， Deir ez-Zor and Aleppo. It tried to avoid loss of its major force through forcing local people to fight as “human shields，” and in the way of various street battles and guerrilla wars. Meanwhile it decentralized the major force into small groups and then concentrated all the decentralized forces intermittently， thus to launch seesaw battles with Syrian government forces and maintain the status of a strategic stalemate. In Iraq， IS occupied and dwelled in several large- and medium-sized cities as Mosul， shortly seized Ramadi， capital of Anbar province in “Sunni Triangle” though it withdrew proactively in the end of 2015， made tactical advance in Fallujah， Baqubah and some other cities， and continued its peripheral penetration to Bagdad. In the main battlefields in Syria and Iraq， relying on the strong air cover of the US and Russia， both countries’ government forces took the advantage of their heavy equipment in ground fire and launched counterattacks in some regions. Based on these advantages and IS’ systematical strategic contraction to reduce casualty in sparsely populated areas， the government forces retook more than 20，000 square kilometers lost ground， which made the “territory” of IS only 240，000 square kilometers， nearly the same size of the UK. However， the two governments performed quite differently in attack and defense transition situation in the battle with IS： the Syrian government force has taken offensive attack from the former defensive situation while the Iraqi government force has lost a few key cities for several times and suffered large casualties when it confronted with insistent recalcitrant counter fire of IS on multiple fronts.
To alleviate the pressure in the main battlefields， IS started trans-continental expansion under the flags of “Transforming the Islamic World” and “Conquering the Infidels.” Firstly， on the problem of supply difficulty after the airstrike by the US and Russia， IS re-integrated its remaining force in the main battlefields in Syria and Iraq， cut down “redundant personnel” including the “Foreign Jihadists” from the Arab World， South Asia， Southeast Asia， West and East Africa， Central Asia， Transcaucasia， Europe and the US， and encouraged them to return to their home countries to spread the “jihadist fire，” establish peripheral branches， “consciously and actively ”fight against the interests of Europe and the US， and some other secular or atheism regimes， and punish those pagans and non-believers according to the geographic， time and other local conditions. Secondly， IS called for the terrorist groups above to “swear allegiance” and promise high posts and other favors such as “ligancy” to them. These two measures achieved significant success， which made IS’ fierce trans-continental expansion keep in an extreme favorable status.
After IS established its Libyan branch， the Egyptian group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis （Supporters of Jerusalem） joined IS， and the Abu Sayyaf Jihadist Group in the Philippines took the oath of allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2014， IS successively announced a few Muslim countries or regions， including Egypt， Saudi Arabia， Yemen， Algeria， Afghanistan， Pakistan， Nigeria， Chechnya and Dagestan to be its “wilayah”（namely province） from the beginning of 2015， and even appointed “Chief Executives” or “Emir” （namely commander） in these regions. Meanwhile， terrorist groups（or a part of them） from over 10 countries， such as Boko Haram in Nigeria， several branches of Al-Shabbaab of Somali， Ansar al-Shari’a （Supporters of Shari’a Law） in Yemen and Libya， and external wings of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan（IMU）， swore allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In term of its hazards， IS launched systemic large-scale massacres towards the Shias， Yazidis， Kurds， prisoners from government forces and foreigners in the main battlefields in Syria and Iraq， which took the lives of tens of thousands. For instance， according to the communiqué published by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq （UNAMI） on January 1st， 2016， 7，515 individuals died and 14，855 individuals were wounded in the terrorist activities only in Iraq in 2015， which was mainly caused by IS. Out of fear， millions of Syrian citizens fled away as refugees from the regions controlled by IS， as the armed force of IS committed all kinds of crimes in every land they appeared， such as looting banks and shops， raping， kidnapping， destroying non-Islamic historical sites and heritages of human civilization， ruining numbers of cities and towns and damaging livelihood facilities. Not only in Syria and Iraq， IS also committed a lot of terrorist activities in external regions， such as “Islamic Jihad” in countries and regions like Yemen， Egypt， Libya， Tunisia， Europe and the US. Among these activities， the most influential incidents included Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks in France， Sousse Hotel attacks in Tunis， series of terrorist attacks in Paris， terrorist shootings in California， etc. Meanwhile， out of worship， some terrorist groups who swore allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi also committed numbers of appalling terrorist attacks， such as Kenyan Moi University terrorist shooting committed by al-Shabaab， Bamako Hotel attack in Mali committed by al-Mourabitoun. IS is now generally recognized as the most dangerous terrorist group in the world， as it planned to establish a “Worldwide Caliphate，” widely spread its “Jihadi-Salafism” ideology and doctrines to numbers of countries， and committed numbers of terrorist activities.
The Realignment， Regrouping and Strategic Adjustment of International Terrorism
The rapid rise of IS led to a kind of “spillover effect” in Middle East， North， West and East Africa， South Asia， Southeast Asia， Transcaucasia and some other regions， which triggered the realignment， regrouping and strategic adjustment of the international terrorism as follows：
IS and al-Qaeda are contending for the leadership of global terrorist ideology and movement， in which the influence of the former one is exceeding the latter one
On June 29， 2014， Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi， the head of IS， made the speech of Declaration of Caliphate in Mosul， northern Iraq， in which he criticized that al-Qaeda under the fatuous governance of Ayman al-Zawahiri only lived off the legacy of 9.11 Attack， attempted and accomplished nothing in the past 10 years， and boasted of its few efforts on expanding the “Islamic Jihadi，” which had made it lose the credibility and qualification of “building a new world” through “Islamic Jihadi.” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared that， with the establishment of “Islamic Caliphate，” he， as the Caliph， would lead all the devout Muslims to fight for “the worldwide converts to Islam，” as “this glorious mission has historically fell on the shoulder of Ibrahim （one epithet of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi） and his jurist team of Islamic law.” At the same time， Ayman al-Zawahiri， the head of al-Qaeda， also made a few speeches to refute that， the political and religious behaviors of IS under the autocracy of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi were over bloody and cruel that it harmed the image and moral basis of “Islamic Jihadi” and misled the devout Muslims， as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi distorted the Islamic law. Ayman al-Zawahiri reminded all the supporters of “Islamic Jihadi” not to be deceived by al-Baghdadi and the only correct choice was to unite under the leadership of al-Qaeda. The two leaders just stuck to their own argument and denied each other. Under this situation， terrorist groups in Middle East， North， West and East Africa， South Asia， Southeast Asia， Transcaucasia and some other regions had to decide which side to follow. Generally speaking， in term of overall terrorist force distribution， most of them supported IS in the end. There are four reasons for this situation： Firstly， IS’ propaganda of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is the lineal descent by blood of Prophet Muhammad proved to be effective； secondly， the achievement of IS on “Islamic Jihadi” is indeed greater than al-Qaeda and its branches； thirdly， IS won large worship by terrorist groups through its success in withstanding the airstrikes by Russia and the US and destroying a large part of government force in the main battlefields in Syria and Iraq； fourthly， the amount of IS’ military payment and pension for martyrs to its followers is several times higher than al-Qaeda’s and its branches’. Al-Qaeda is faced with the bottleneck in the process of development， as it cannot take effective command and control over its branches
Since the Afghanistan War launched by the US in 2001， al-Qaeda has been struggling weakly on self-recovering and living space expansion. Al-Qaeda and its branches were demoralized after their leader Osama bin Laden was killed by US troops on May 1st， 2011. Al-Qaeda，was taken over by Ayman al-Zawahiri thereafter. Though years’ efforts， it still cannot reverse the demoralized trend. The main reasons are： firstly， al-Qaeda never gained its own “territory，” instead， it had to live under the protection of Afghanistan and Pakistan Taliban， and its expansion needs the permission of the two Taliban in advance； secondly， there are internal contradictions between Afghanistan and Pakistan Taliban on which the al-Qaeda cannot mediate， and furthermore Aymanal-Zawahiri will fall into an awkward predicament and even suffer from double pressures when Afghanistan and Pakistan Taliban request it to undertake the “obligation”； thirdly， as the rapid rising of terrorist groups like IS， al-Nusra Front， and Lashkar-e-Islam， they attract a large portion of “donation” from the main traditional sponsors of al-Qaeda， which makes al-Qaeda face financial embarrassment that it even cannot provide financial support for a large scale of terrorist activities； fourthly， the armed forces under al-Qaeda suffered from great casualties from the war， wound， disability， disease， cold weather and food shortage that they could not commit more terrorist actions directly. The result was that its weapons remained used and obsolete and its combat ability dropped since it could not seize new weapons， equipment and logistics supplies from battles any more， thus greatly reducing al-Qaeda’ effectiveness of political influence and external propaganda consequently. The religious and political authority of al-Qaeda was particularly doubted by its branches in “Arabian Peninsula，” Maghreb， Sinai and Somali when Ayman al-Zawahiri failed to arbitrate the disputes between IS and al-Nusra Front in February 2014. These branches even reached mutual understanding of cooperation to respect each other’s interest pursuit and “sphere of influence” with IS branches in Yemen， Saudi Arabia， Egypt， Libya， Algeria， Somali and some other countries. In contrast with IS’ openly denying attitude towards al-Qaeda Headquarters， the behaviors of al-Qaeda’s branches obviously indicate the failure of commanding of al-Qaeda Headquarters. Out of survival needs， some terrorist groups getting benefits from the competing both sides of IS and al-Qaeda as their supports
IS and al-Qaeda are now deeply rooted in many countries while numbers of medium-and small-sized terrorist groups still exist in their “spheres of influence.” Though IS and al-Qaeda both enjoy overwhelming power and influence among all the terrorist groups and share the similar pursuit of ideology and value with other groups， those medium- and small-sized terrorist groups are still unwilling to be tied together with battles of IS and al-Qaeda and even take precautions against the potential swallowing-up by the two giants. In order to achieve their own political goals preemptively and avoid causing unnecessary danger by offending the two giants， they explore several ways to survive under the “Jihad hegemony，” including providing “special talents” to both sides within the scope of their ability， paying “Jihad Tax” regularly， coordinating on military operations or assisting in tactical coordination， flattering the leaders of both sides， transferring part of the peripheral groups to “pledge allegiance” to both sides when they are under the great pressure. For instance， the East Turkistan Islamic Movement （ETIM） and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan （IMU）， two groups eluding between Afghanistan and Pakistan， once transferred “key military members” to al-Qaeda， and meanwhile expressed “worship and admiration” to IS through online video and even mobilized a part of terrorists to go to Syria to join IS when IS set the “Command of Front Line” and recruited followers in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Besides， when branches of al-Qaeda and IS competed on “localized-development” in Somali， al-Shabbaab arranged several peripheral groups subjected to IS while its main force still pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda Somali branch. Out of the need of competing for “sphere of influence，” both IS and al-Qaeda took comprehensive measures to allure and attract the allegiance of those medium-and small-sized terrorist groups.
Various terrorist groups adjusted their “Jihad Strategy” to meet the changes in external environment
The reasons behind this strategic adjustment wave include： the disorder of a few countries in West Asia and North Africa after more than five years’ turmoil and the overlaps of various new and old conflicts without any solution provide favorable place， time and the social basis for the development of terrorism； the heavy military pressure caused by the anti-terrorist airstrikes of the United States and Russia in Syria and Iraq forced these groups to adjust their strategies； countries as Pakistan， Afghanistan， Saudi Arabia， Egypt and Jordan exposed large security defense weaknesses and vulnerabilities though they has put more strengths on anti-terrorism in recent years； the warming-up of internal economic and social ethnic and religious conflicts in some South Asia and Southeast Asia countries leave more space for the development of terrorism. Generally speaking， the basic characteristics of the present external environment for terrorism are strategically favourable and tactically serious. Under this background， international terrorist groups made the following strategic adjustments：
Starting to learn the achievements in “theoretical innovation” from each other to guide their “Islamic Jihad.” Different versions of “Jihad Theory” now have made massive innovations and become inclusive and complementary to each other， though the two “Bellwether Groups” of international terrorist organizations （namely IS and al-Qaeda） denied each other while the medium-and small-sized terrorist groups also continually undermined each other’s development. The theories generally acknowledged by them include as follows： the demarcation of enemy and friend theory， resistance of violence theory， active attack theory， spiritual deterrence theory， avoiding enemy’s main forces and striking the weak point theory， eternal jihad theory， jihad phases theory， destined jihad victory theory， the Islamic pure society theory， etc. These theories， whose “correctness” and “effectiveness” had been proved by numbers of terrorist practices， are the ideological basis of terrorist groups’ strategy-making. As for strategic orientation， the major terrorist groups like IS， al-Qaeda and their branches， Al-Shabbaab and Boko Haram， particularly emphasize “controlling the main battlefield firmly” and “expanding in exterior regions.”
Imitating each others’ terrorist attack tactics for space expansion. International terrorist groups with different sizes are not state actors in the sense of international laws， and they are not able to initiate the conventional wars between the state actors from the perspective of hard power of military and war mobilization ability， though the “objectives of jihad” are state actors and citizens. These characteristics decide the asymmetry and dissimilation of terrorist violence methods and means towards state actors and citizens. With a view to increasing the efficiency and effect of terrorist activities， and keeping the strength of the groups， no matter whether IS and al-Qaeda， or medium-and small-sized international terrorist groups， they have all begun to learn and imitate each other’s terrorist attack tactics and it is possible to summarize some common routines， including： （1） trying to avoid fighting with government forces and special forces； （2） choosing densely populated areas like sports venues， transport hubs， concerts， squares， bars， nightclubs， mosques， campuses， stores and hospitals as attack sites； （3） taking civilians as “soft targets”； （4） taking actions at different sites at the same time； （5） committing serial shootings， car bombings， suicide bombings， airline hijackings and bombings， hostage-taking and beheadings， and bus passenger hijackings， poisoning drinking water， destroying power facilities and gas pipelines， and promoting the “localization” of terrorist activities； （6） encouraging “Lone Wolf” style terrorist activities； （7） expanding network effect through multimedia technology； （8） preaching “jihad” doctrines through Internet and recruiting “jihadists” globally， inciting brainwashed young people to initiate “jihadist” activities in different countries， etc. IS’ financial support approaches were imitated by other terrorist groups. The supply of financial resources is crucial to the sustainable development of various terrorist groups in the world. The raising ability of operation funds differentiates between various terrorist groups due to respective surviving and developing conditions. IS’ ostentatious financial resources raising ability and strength not only led to massive “envy” but also widened imitation by other terrorist groups. For example， based on its natural resources endowment in the so-called “Jihad Region，” Boko Haram in Nigeria is mining and smuggling oil illegally； ETIM， IMU and Haqqani Network are joining in drug transactions； groups as Hizb ut-Tahrir in Ferghana Valley are reselling antiques； and Islamic Emirate of Chechnya， Abu Sayyaf Jihadist Group in the Philippines and Ansar al-Shari’a in Libya are increasing the amount of Zakāt （Islamic Tax） in the region they controlled to support their terrorist activities.
Current Status and Prospect of International Anti-Terrorism Cooperation
The savage acts in Syria and Iraq， exterior expansion of IS and many other terrorist groups， not only posed huge threats to the ruling status of governments in Syria and Iraq， but also harmed the benefits of multiple countries and parties， which pushed these countries to wave flags of anti-terrorists and form various anti-terrorism alliances according to different consideration of self-interests. These alliances include the anti-IS alliance led by the US； anti-terrorism group composed by Russia， Iraq， Iran and Syria； and Muslim nations anti-terrorism alliance led by Saudi Arabia， aiming at casting all forms of fighting against the targets in Syria and Iraq， and exterior expansion regions controlled by IS and other terrorist groups. Despite that， the existing force of IS and other terrorist groups still put large strength on exterior expansion， since all the anti-terrorist alliance countries and parties are reluctant to work together as follows：
The US still treats terrorist groups such as IS as the main forces to overthrow the Bashar al-Assad regime and is not willing to destroy them thoroughly
To promote the regime change in Syria is the key part of the neo-interventionism carried out by the US in Middle East， which aims at cutting off the “Shia Crescent” centered around Iran to realize the democratic transformation of the whole Middle East. The US once put great expectations on opposition forces such as Syrian National Council and Free Syrian Army at the beginning when Arab Spring was spread to Syria and even started the enlargement and training plan of Free Syrian Army. However， as the Free Syrian Army was afraid to fight and the training plan was soon proved to be a failure， the US shifted its expectation on terrorist groups like IS to overthrow Bashar al-Assad’s regime， and assisted the opposition forces such as Syrian National Council and Free Syrian Army to take the rule， and finally instigated Western and regional alliances to destroy terrorist groups such as IS according to specific situation then. Reluctantly the US began to cast airstrikes on the targets of terrorist groups like IS in Syria and Iraq in August 2014， when IS and other terrorist groups rose rapidly and posed huge threats on the regimes of Iraq， Jordan and other countries from June 2014. Even though， the US does not completely give up the plan of making use of terrorist groups like IS to inflict heavy losses on the Bashar al-Assad regime. Saudi Arabia， Turkey and some other countries pushing for the overthrow of the Bashar al-Assad regime attempt to take advantage of IS to serve their geo-political interests
These countries never try to hide their obsessive desire and pursuit of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad’s regime， even do not change their original intentions when confronting terrorist threats themselves. In their views， it is Bashar al-Assad’s unwillingness to step down that led to the emerging of terrorist groups like IS， and consequently caused the humanitarian crisis and refugee wave in Syria. They believe these problems will not be solved until the Bashar al-Assad’s regime is overthrown. For the US， it tends to make use of terrorist groups like IS to achieve its goals when it found that these forces posed much larger threat on the Bashar al-Assad’s regime than the so-called moderate opposition groups like Free Syrian Army. Under the pressure of international public opinion， these countries joined the anti-IS airstrike alliance led by the US， dropped a few bombs symbolically and then attempted and accomplished nothing. As terrorist groups like IS having committed terrorist attacks in Europe and many other regions in the world， more and more countries including France， the UK， Germany and Belgium are tending to counter terrorism whole-heartedly and calling for a more efficient international anti-terrorism alliance. Hence officials of Saudi Arabia， Turkey and some other countries began to deny any collusion with terrorist groups like IS and showed that they would prohibit folk religious institutions and the rich providing financial support for these groups. However， in the regional agenda， Saudi Arabia， Turkey and some other regional countries prioritized the overthrowing of the Bashar al-Assad’s regime than striking IS and other terrorist groups.
Many countries fear to counter terrorism
Some Asian， African and European countries， including the countries which suffered a lot from the scourge of IS and other terrorist groups， are afraid to fight against these groups determinedly. Firstly， they dare not recognize terrorist forces like IS as international terrorist groups， out of the worry of bringing trouble and revenge home. Some of them even recognize terrorist forces like IS as “religious thought trend and movement with unremitting value pursuit，” and try to gain the favor of these groups by openly appreciating these groups’ slogan of “Destroying Israel.” Secondly， they are also too afraid of bringing revenge home to join the international anti-terrorism activities. “Double Standards” are restricting the strength of international anti-terrorism efforts
As far as international anti-terrorism struggle concerned， there are indeed some “Double Standards” in public opinion instigating and domestic and foreign policies follow-ups. With the aim of containing the rising of other great powers， some great powers interfere in the internal affairs of other great powers， including making use of ethnic， religious and other issues of those regarded as rival powers to boost their national secession. For example， some countries once criticized Russia’s anti-terrorism activities in Chechnya， as they believed Russia’s military activities on anti-terrorism violated the human rights of Chechnya Muslims and caused local humanitarian crisis， meanwhile they turned a blind eye to the huge harm caused by Chechnya terrorist groups to Russia’s national security and people’s lives. Another example， out of the consideration of hindering China’s peaceful development， and the divergence on political system， ideology and values， or the ethnic affection and religious mission， some countries publicly supported the terrorist activities of ETIM through various means and ways so as to disorder Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. They even embellished ETIM’s terrorist activities as “national self-determination movement，” distorted China’s ethnic and religious policies， and maligned China’s anti-terrorism activities and other legal activities to maintain stability in Xinjiang. The “Double Standards” of some countries are also demonstrated in that， they usually recognize other international actors’ behaviors and power growing as terrorism and terrorist groups according to the consideration of whether these behaviors or power growing will threaten their own interests and security actually or potentially.
Looking into 2016， the situation of international anti-terrorism will still be complex and serious， in which the structure of two major international terrorist forces as the centers will remain， and the terrorist groups including IS， al-Nusra Front， ETIM will remain confronting the global anti-terrorism forces. International society’s understanding of the harm of terrorism will also be further deepened. As the UN Security Council has recognized these groups as international terrorist groups， some countries may correct their views and recognition of IS， al-Nusra Front， ETIM and other terrorist groups. Consequently， more and more countries will join the international anti-terrorism efforts. Meanwhile， given that the economic， political and social ideological roots for terrorism and extremism cannot be eliminated in a short time， the international fight against terrorism will have a long march.