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对电力市场中的重复拍卖,用动态博弈的方法,以电价为参考变量,利用Betrand模型重点研究了Pool模式下纯策略Nash均衡点的唯一性与稳定性,以及Nash均衡的收敛性质。研究结果表明,均衡点的稳定性与发电容量必须运行率(MRR)以及由MRR决定的均衡点的个数关系密切,当均衡点唯一时必然稳定;存在多个均衡点时均衡点的稳定性与市场初始状态有关。文中采用了全局稳定、区域稳定、随机状态、等效边际成本等概念来更好地说明电力市场中的问题,并且用图形的方法直观地对均衡点的稳定性问题做出了描述。
This paper focuses on the uniqueness and stability of the pure strategy Nash equilibrium point under the Pool mode and the convergence property of the Nash equilibrium using the Betrand model for the repeated auctions in the electricity market with the dynamic game method and the electricity price as the reference variable. The results show that the stability of the equilibrium point is closely related to the MRR and the number of equilibrium points determined by the MRR, and must be stable when the equilibrium point is unique. The stability of the equilibrium point when there are multiple equilibrium points And the initial state of the market. In this paper, concepts of global stability, regional stability, stochastic state and equivalent marginal cost are used to illustrate the problems in the electricity market better. The stability of the equilibrium point is intuitively described by the graphical method.