通过研究风险投资减持过程中的盈余管理,本文发现,在减持过程中,风险投资试图影响管理层,以提高减持前的会计收益,从而获得更高的减持收益,但这种模式只存在利用后半年定期报告进行减持时机选择的情况下,这意味着风险投资的盈余管理减持时机选择有赖于上市公司本身的盈余管理动机。且随着风险投资在减持前持股比例的增加,风险投资减持对后半年季度盈余管理的影响能力进一步增加。进一步研究发现,由于国有风险投资对被投资企业的谈判能力更强,参与程度更高,其表现出比非国有风险投资更显著的减持机会主义。在控制内生性问题后,上述结论依然没有发生重大变化。 Through the study of Earnings Management during the process of reduction of venture capital, this paper finds that in the process of reduction, venture capital tries to influence the management to increase the pre-reduction accounting income, so as to obtain a higher reduction of returns, but this model Only the use of periodic reports after the second half of the time to choose the opportunity to reduce, which means that venture capital investment management to reduce the timing of the timing depends on the listed company’s earnings management motivation. With the increase in the proportion of venture capital before the shareholding lessening, the reduction of risk investment will further increase the impact on the quarterly earnings management in the second half of the year. Further study found that state-owned venture capital (VC) has shown more significant reduction opportunism than non-state-owned venture capital because of its stronger ability to negotiate with investee companies and higher level of participation. After controlling for endogeneity, the above conclusion still has not changed significantly.