论文部分内容阅读
通过两阶段博弈模型构建,文章研究了排污权交易条件下的最优减排研发补贴政策,分析了减排研发补贴政策对污染物减排、企业利润及社会福利的影响,并进一步利用数值模拟方法讨论了减排研发补贴与排污税政策搭配使用的效果。结论表明:首先,当排污权的市场交易价格小于某一阈值时,政府应对企业的减排研发进行适当补贴;当交易价格等于或超过该阈值时,政府不提供补贴或对企业的减排研发进行征税。其次,排污权交易条件下,减排研发补贴政策具有较好的减排效果,并且能够提高企业的利润和社会福利水平。最后,政府选择合适的排污税与研发补贴搭配使用不仅能激活排污权交易市场,还能使得研发补贴政策的利润和社会福利效果最优,从而实现经济和环境的协调发展。
Through the construction of two-stage game model, this paper studies the optimal R & D subsidy policy under emission trading conditions, analyzes the impact of R & D subsidy policy on pollutant emission reduction, corporate profits and social welfare, and further uses numerical simulation The method discussed the effect of R & D subsidy and emission tax policies. The conclusion is as follows: Firstly, when the market transaction price of the emission rights is less than a certain threshold, the government should subsidize the R & D of enterprises’ emission reduction appropriately; when the transaction price equals or exceeds this threshold, the government does not provide subsidies or R & D of enterprises Taxation. Second, under the emission trading conditions, the R & D subsidy policy for emission reduction has a good emission reduction effect and can improve the profitability and social welfare of enterprises. Finally, when the government chooses the appropriate sewage tax and R & D subsidy, it can not only activate the trading market of emission rights, but also optimize the profit and social welfare of R & D subsidy policy so as to realize the coordinated development of economy and environment.