当前比较常见的衡量经理业绩做法是：如果经理在下一年（或者下一季度）能够完成一定数量的任务指标（通常是利润指标），则会得到可观的奖励；否则就被免职。表面上看，这种方式会增加经理危机感，并促使其更加努力工作。事实上，这一激励手段往往会为企业埋下许多隐患，不可 The current more common measure of manager performance is: If the manager in the next year (or the next quarter) to complete a certain number of task indicators (usually profit targets), you will receive substantial rewards; otherwise be dismissed. On the face of it, this approach can add to managers' sense of crisis and make them work harder. In fact, this incentive often means many hidden dangers for the enterprise