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所有权与控制权的分离产生了委托代理关系,在此关系中,为解决因利益不一致和信息不对称引起的代理成本问题,委托人需要根据观察的信息进行激励约束机制设计,引导代理人选择对委托人最有利的行动。委托代理关系普遍地存在于政府行政领域,运用委托代理理论分析官员行政权力监督,建构有效的激励约束机制,旨在促进高效行政和民主监督。
In this relationship, in order to solve the agency costs caused by inconsistent interests and asymmetric information, the principal needs to design the incentive and restraint mechanism according to the observed information and guide the agent to choose the right agent. The client’s most advantageous action. The principal-agent relationship exists in the government administration area generally. It uses the principal-agent theory to analyze the supervision of officials’ administrative power and construct an effective incentive and restraint mechanism to promote efficient administration and democratic supervision.