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基于拍卖机制设计理论,针对多个发电权出让方及多个发电权受让方参与的发电权交易市场,提出了一种激励相容的双边拍卖机制。首先描述了发电权双边拍卖交易过程,然后建立了考虑交易成本损耗的数学模型,并在该模型的基础上提出了一种双边拍卖机制,该机制对所有风险规避的发电权出让方及发电权受让方是激励相容和个体理性的,且在该机制下整个系统是弱预算平衡的。算例分析表明所述机制富有效率。
Based on the auction mechanism design theory, an incentive-compatible bilateral auction mechanism is proposed for the power generation trading market involving multiple generators of power generation rights and multiple transferee of power generation rights. Firstly, the bilateral auction transaction process of power generation rights is described. Then, a mathematical model considering the loss of transaction costs is established. Based on this model, a bilateral auction mechanism is proposed, which provides a mechanism for all risk-averse generators and power generation rights The assignee is incentive-compatible and individualistic, and under this mechanism the entire system is weakly balanced. Case studies show that the mechanism is efficient.