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文章以中国上市A股公司为研究样本,以2004-2012年具有好消息的上市公司年报披露为观察对象,实证研究了拥有利好消息的公司为何要延迟披露信息。研究结论发现,上述公司延迟披露信息,不能被会计稳健性理论所解释,实证结果亦与信息不对称的相关理论背离。文章结论表明,拥有利好消息的公司延迟披露信息,与较为及时披露信息的公司相比,其信息披露前的股价与市场同步性低、交易量高,股东持股集中度在窗口期前发生了显著增加的变化特征。这表明,利好消息公司延迟披露信息,一种关于其动机的理论解释是该类公司通过延迟披露信息可以为内幕交易获得时间窗口,从而帮助其在股票交易市场中获利。文章预期对理解新兴市场的金融、会计行为,丰富完善信息披露文献,以及为强化监管提供经验证据支持有重要作用。
The article takes the Chinese listed A-share companies as the research sample, takes the annual report disclosures of the listed companies with good news from 2004 to 2012 as the observation object, and empirically studies why the companies with good news should delay the disclosure of information. The conclusion of the study shows that the delayed disclosure of the above information can not be explained by the accounting conservatism theory, and the empirical results deviate from the related theory of information asymmetry. The conclusion of the article shows that companies with good news delayed the disclosure of information. Compared with the companies that disclosed the information in a timely manner, the company had low price and market synchronization before the information disclosure, the transaction volume was high, and the shareholder concentration concentration occurred before the window period Significantly increased change characteristics. This suggests that good news companies delay disclosing information, and a theoretical explanation for their motivation is that such companies can help them profit in the stock exchange by delaying the disclosure of information to gain time windows for insider trading. The article is expected to play an important role in understanding the financial and accounting behavior in emerging markets, enriching the literature on information disclosure, and providing empirical evidence to strengthen regulation.