由于信息不对称,企业董事会不能观测到企业经营者工作的努力水平,因此,企业董事会需要对企业经营者进行激励。本文探讨了将能力系数和市场调研成本引入最优激励契约模型,给出了相应的最优风险激励系数和代理成本,并分析了各因素对它们的影响。通过“标尺竞争”可以提高激励强度,降低代理成本,增强激励的有效性。 Due to the asymmetric information, the board of directors of the company cannot observe the level of effort of the company’s managers. Therefore, the board of directors of the company needs to encourage the managers of the company. This paper discusses the introduction of the ability coefficient and market research cost into the optimal incentive contract model, gives the corresponding optimal risk incentive coefficient and agency cost, and analyzes the influence of various factors on them. Through “scale competition”, it is possible to increase incentive intensity, reduce agency costs, and increase the effectiveness of incentives.