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公共事业市场化改革从法经济学的视角是公共事业管制者对原有管制合同的违约,其违约行为对在位公共事业企业造成的违约损害即搁置成本,而建立在效率基础上的搁置成本的补偿则是管制合同违约的损害救济,这一逻辑是搁置成本所引发的全部法经济学问题的核心。文章对中国电力市场改革中管制者与公共事业企业的关系进行法经济学的分析,并指出对于长期缺乏法律约束的中国公共事业管制者而言,合理的搁置成本处置将会约束管制者本身,并避免无约束的管制乱用。
From the point of view of law and economics, public utility market reform is the default of public utility regulators on the original control contracts. The default damages caused by the defaults to the incumbent public utilities enterprises are put aside the cost, while the shelved costs based on efficiency Of the compensation is the damage remedy of the control contract breach. This logic is the core of all the legal and economic issues caused by putting aside the costs. This article analyzes the law and economics of the relationship between the regulator and the public utility enterprises in the electricity market reform in China, and points out that for the Chinese public utility regulators who lack the legal restriction for a long time, the reasonable disposal cost will restrain the regulator itself, And to avoid uncontrolled arbitrary control.