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采用实验经济学的方法,将上海车牌拍卖的现行机制与多物品拍卖的两种经典机制——单一价格拍卖和歧视价格拍卖进行比较。实验结果表明,竞买人在上海车牌拍卖组与歧视价格拍卖组中会隐瞒私有价值从而标出较低报价,而在单一价格拍卖组中倾向于出价等于标的物的价值;就卖方收益而言,上海车牌拍卖低于单一价格拍卖,歧视价格拍卖最高;实验中拍卖的效率则以上海车牌拍卖组为最低,单一价格拍卖居中,歧视价格拍卖组的效率最高。
Using the method of experimental economics, the current mechanism of Shanghai license plate auction is compared with the two classic mechanisms of multi-item auction - single price auction and discriminatory price auction. The experimental results show that bidders in the Shanghai license plate auction group and the discriminatory price auction group will hide the private value to mark the lower bid while in the single price auction group tend to bid equal to the value of the subject matter. In terms of the seller’s return, Shanghai license plate auction is lower than the single price auction, the highest price discrimination auction; experimental auction efficiency is the Shanghai license plate auction group is the lowest, single price auction center, discriminating price auction group the highest efficiency.