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FOLLOWING the victory by Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party （BJP） in the Indian general elections， international society is full of curiosity and expectations on the diplomatic policy of the new government. With regard to China in particular， analysts continue to debate and make predictions. Some believe that Modi， a known hardliner， is likely to pursue tough policies towards China because of the boundary dispute； others argue that， since Modi won the election on an economic platform， he will strengthen cooperation with China in trade and investment； still others expect the Modi administration， with a majority of the lower house of the Indian parliament， to promote a favorable environment for settling the boundary dispute.
In the second decade of the 21st century， is it possible for China and India， the two most populous developing countries， to expand cooperation as well as handle their differences？ Is it only empty rhetoric to say that Asia is big enough for the ambitions and development of two countries？ Is it reasonable for China and India to regard each other as competitors or partners？ Which message will Modi’s planned visits to Japan and the U.S. send to international society？ To have a clear understanding of the features of Sino-Indian relations and its developing trend， it is necessary to take off the tinted spectacles and see the stark realities.
Controlling Disputes through Dialogue Mechanisms
Although there are disagreements and differences between China and India， there are also dialogue mechanisms through which these issues can be measured and controlled.
Undoubtedly， there are practical issues to face directly between the two countries， like the boundary dispute， trade imbalances， the Dalai Lama， water resources， and the relations between a rising China and other South Asian countries. Among these， the boundary issue is the biggest constraint to improved relations. India is uncer- tain of China’s role as a threat or partner， which influences their strategists’ judgment on China’s policies and actions. As a result， India’s limited political and strategic trust in China holds back prospects for deeper economic and trade cooperation. And even worse， the national images in the minds of ordinary people are affected.
The boundary issue has long haunted the Sino-Indian relationship. But the good news is that the decisionmakers of both sides have realized that the issue should not be an obstacle to bilateral cooperation. With joint efforts， China and India have achieved phased results in negotiations， which reflect a qualitative breakthrough in this regard. More importantly， the boundary is under effective control and is the world’s most peaceful border. Since the consultation process for the boundary question was launched in 1981， both countries have successively addressed the issue through vice-ministerial level talks， joint working group discussions， diplomatic and military panels， special delegations and consultation and coordination mechanisms. After 30 years， the results are tangible： we have now formed a consensus on political guiding principles （in 2005）， established two important negotiation mechanisms （in 2003 and 2012 respectively） and signed three agreements on boundary control （in 1993， 1996 and 2013）. In other words， the guiding principles and related treaties have become an important support for dealing with and eventually resolving the border dispute.
In addition， the two countries have institutionalized contact， dialogue and consultation mechanisms， which have become a key channel for communication and understanding. China and India have established the Special Representative Dialogue Mechanism on the Boundary Question （in 2003）， the Boundary Issue Consultation and Coordination Mechanism （in 2012）， the Defense and Security Consultation between National Defense Departments （in 2007） and the Strategic Dialogue between Foreign Ministries （in 2005）. More importantly， the China-India Strategic Economic Dialogue Mechanism was established in 2011 concerning industrial policies and pragmatic cooperation in economic trend， macroeconomic policy and related fields.
A Promising Future of Political Mutual Trust
With clear-cut relationship and positioning， China and India have a definite direction for future development.
Since 1988， high-level exchanges and agreements have explicitly specified the positioning of the SinoIndian relationship， answering the question of “friend or foe” and “competition or partnership.” In 2003， the two governments agreed， “The common interests of the two sides outweigh their differences. The two countries are not a threat to each other. Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other.” The 2005 SinoIndian Joint Statement decided to establish a “strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity，” and strategic cooperation thereafter became the main thread of bilateral relations. In 2006， the Joint Statement further defined the nature of the partnership as mutually beneficial cooperation and highlighted the positioning of mutual benefit. And the 2013 Joint Statement declared “both countries view each other as partners for mutual benefit and not as rivals or competitors，” indicating a qualitative improvement in image building for both parties. In retrospect， complicated problems remain and the room for developing political mutual trust is still large. But an obvious fact is that political mutual trust is increasing. The 2013 Joint Statement， to some degree， addressed major security concerns from both sides – “The two sides will not allow their territories to be used for activities against the other” and “the two sides are committed to taking a positive view of and support each other’s friendship with other countries.” As early as 1988， then Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping asserted that the development of both China and India was needed to inaugurate the Asian century. He told visiting Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi that a real Asia-Pacific century or an Asian century would come only if China， India and other neighboring countries developed. Former Prime Minister Singh also reaffirmed on many occasions that the world has enough space to accommodate the ambitions of both India and China. These prevailing judgments， made from a strategic perspective， have laid a foundation for stable bilateral relations today.
The rational attitude toward one another’s development is the key to bilateral relations. The 2006 Joint Statement declared that both sides welcome and positively regard each other’s development and have enough space for a larger scale of joint development； the 2013 Joint Statement further stated， “The world needs common development of both countries，” and both countries “welcome each other’s peaceful development and regard it as a mutually reinforcing process.” These statements indicate the future trend is cooperation instead of confrontation， and partnership instead of rivalry. In addition， Premier Li Keqiang chose India as his first diplomatic visit destination in May 2013， emphasizing the natural partnership with India and that the relations with India constitute a major priority of Chinese diplomacy. Then-Prime Minister Singh also made it clear when he visited China last October that friendship with China is an Indian priority.
New Opportunities
The accelerated integration of the Indian Ocean and the Asia-Pacific brought both opportunities and challenges to the future development of the two countries.
The Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean are rapidly integrating. Trans-national economic， trade and investment have made the two economies， though geographically distinct， begin to attain the primary qualities of regional economic integration. On the one hand， as the economic center of gravity moves eastward， the two oceans are becoming the world’s most dynamic regions； on the other， strengthened economic links between the two regions have accelerated their economic interaction. China hopes to take this opportunity to restore the Maritime Silk Road， while India wishes to advance its “eastward strategy.” This is an opportunity as well as a challenge for SinoIndian cooperation. The opportunity lies in the economy. Given their complementary economies， the two countries are natural partners， and have preset a goal of US $100 billion in bilateral trade in 2015. Currently the two countries have agreed to speed up pragmatic cooperation to dovetail the two giant markets and promote regional economic integration. Both will advance infrastructure to give full play to the convergence of interests between India’s “eastward policy” and China’s openness to the West. The BCIM （Bangladesh， China， India and Myanmar） Economic Corridor， initiated by China and India， embodies the convergence of interests.
On the other hand， a challenge exists in the expansion of strategic space， and in diplomatic and defense practices guided by this. India， judging from its developing environment and the Asia-Pacific regional situation and power pattern， gives priority to the Asia-Pacific region. Its interaction with other Asia-Pacific countries like Japan and U.S.， to some degree， is a reasonable concern of China. Meanwhile， China’s restoration of the Maritime Silk Road and enhanced cooperation with Indian Oceanic countries is a strategic concern of India. Against the backdrop of the U.S.-dominated Asia-Pacific alliance system， the global strategic partnership between India and Japan is likely to advance. These mechanisms or arrangements are intended to target a rising China and restrain China’s influence. However， objectively speaking， they also reflect India’s pursuit of strategic independence and power balance， as well as economic development， promoting cultural influence and establishing the positive image of a democratic country.
In summary， under rational judgment， politically China and India have more cooperation than confrontation； economically mutual complementation between the two sides is bigger than competition； and culturally the two sides have more affinity than conflicts. It is not objective to partially emphasize mutual benefit or overstate divergences and conflicts. Bilateral development is predestined to face challenges， differences of opinion and goals， as well as expansion， intersection and collision of the two countries’ strategic interests. However， the reached consensus， mechanisms and signed agreements have laid foundations for a steady improvement of mutual political trust and healthy development. Decision-makers of both countries have emphasized that the bilateral relations are significant in global and strategic respects， reflecting their desire for a positive attitude to promote understanding and communication， effectively control disparities， and advance common interests.
In the second decade of the 21st century， is it possible for China and India， the two most populous developing countries， to expand cooperation as well as handle their differences？ Is it only empty rhetoric to say that Asia is big enough for the ambitions and development of two countries？ Is it reasonable for China and India to regard each other as competitors or partners？ Which message will Modi’s planned visits to Japan and the U.S. send to international society？ To have a clear understanding of the features of Sino-Indian relations and its developing trend， it is necessary to take off the tinted spectacles and see the stark realities.
Controlling Disputes through Dialogue Mechanisms
Although there are disagreements and differences between China and India， there are also dialogue mechanisms through which these issues can be measured and controlled.
Undoubtedly， there are practical issues to face directly between the two countries， like the boundary dispute， trade imbalances， the Dalai Lama， water resources， and the relations between a rising China and other South Asian countries. Among these， the boundary issue is the biggest constraint to improved relations. India is uncer- tain of China’s role as a threat or partner， which influences their strategists’ judgment on China’s policies and actions. As a result， India’s limited political and strategic trust in China holds back prospects for deeper economic and trade cooperation. And even worse， the national images in the minds of ordinary people are affected.
The boundary issue has long haunted the Sino-Indian relationship. But the good news is that the decisionmakers of both sides have realized that the issue should not be an obstacle to bilateral cooperation. With joint efforts， China and India have achieved phased results in negotiations， which reflect a qualitative breakthrough in this regard. More importantly， the boundary is under effective control and is the world’s most peaceful border. Since the consultation process for the boundary question was launched in 1981， both countries have successively addressed the issue through vice-ministerial level talks， joint working group discussions， diplomatic and military panels， special delegations and consultation and coordination mechanisms. After 30 years， the results are tangible： we have now formed a consensus on political guiding principles （in 2005）， established two important negotiation mechanisms （in 2003 and 2012 respectively） and signed three agreements on boundary control （in 1993， 1996 and 2013）. In other words， the guiding principles and related treaties have become an important support for dealing with and eventually resolving the border dispute.
In addition， the two countries have institutionalized contact， dialogue and consultation mechanisms， which have become a key channel for communication and understanding. China and India have established the Special Representative Dialogue Mechanism on the Boundary Question （in 2003）， the Boundary Issue Consultation and Coordination Mechanism （in 2012）， the Defense and Security Consultation between National Defense Departments （in 2007） and the Strategic Dialogue between Foreign Ministries （in 2005）. More importantly， the China-India Strategic Economic Dialogue Mechanism was established in 2011 concerning industrial policies and pragmatic cooperation in economic trend， macroeconomic policy and related fields.
A Promising Future of Political Mutual Trust
With clear-cut relationship and positioning， China and India have a definite direction for future development.
Since 1988， high-level exchanges and agreements have explicitly specified the positioning of the SinoIndian relationship， answering the question of “friend or foe” and “competition or partnership.” In 2003， the two governments agreed， “The common interests of the two sides outweigh their differences. The two countries are not a threat to each other. Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other.” The 2005 SinoIndian Joint Statement decided to establish a “strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity，” and strategic cooperation thereafter became the main thread of bilateral relations. In 2006， the Joint Statement further defined the nature of the partnership as mutually beneficial cooperation and highlighted the positioning of mutual benefit. And the 2013 Joint Statement declared “both countries view each other as partners for mutual benefit and not as rivals or competitors，” indicating a qualitative improvement in image building for both parties. In retrospect， complicated problems remain and the room for developing political mutual trust is still large. But an obvious fact is that political mutual trust is increasing. The 2013 Joint Statement， to some degree， addressed major security concerns from both sides – “The two sides will not allow their territories to be used for activities against the other” and “the two sides are committed to taking a positive view of and support each other’s friendship with other countries.” As early as 1988， then Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping asserted that the development of both China and India was needed to inaugurate the Asian century. He told visiting Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi that a real Asia-Pacific century or an Asian century would come only if China， India and other neighboring countries developed. Former Prime Minister Singh also reaffirmed on many occasions that the world has enough space to accommodate the ambitions of both India and China. These prevailing judgments， made from a strategic perspective， have laid a foundation for stable bilateral relations today.
The rational attitude toward one another’s development is the key to bilateral relations. The 2006 Joint Statement declared that both sides welcome and positively regard each other’s development and have enough space for a larger scale of joint development； the 2013 Joint Statement further stated， “The world needs common development of both countries，” and both countries “welcome each other’s peaceful development and regard it as a mutually reinforcing process.” These statements indicate the future trend is cooperation instead of confrontation， and partnership instead of rivalry. In addition， Premier Li Keqiang chose India as his first diplomatic visit destination in May 2013， emphasizing the natural partnership with India and that the relations with India constitute a major priority of Chinese diplomacy. Then-Prime Minister Singh also made it clear when he visited China last October that friendship with China is an Indian priority.
New Opportunities
The accelerated integration of the Indian Ocean and the Asia-Pacific brought both opportunities and challenges to the future development of the two countries.
The Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean are rapidly integrating. Trans-national economic， trade and investment have made the two economies， though geographically distinct， begin to attain the primary qualities of regional economic integration. On the one hand， as the economic center of gravity moves eastward， the two oceans are becoming the world’s most dynamic regions； on the other， strengthened economic links between the two regions have accelerated their economic interaction. China hopes to take this opportunity to restore the Maritime Silk Road， while India wishes to advance its “eastward strategy.” This is an opportunity as well as a challenge for SinoIndian cooperation. The opportunity lies in the economy. Given their complementary economies， the two countries are natural partners， and have preset a goal of US $100 billion in bilateral trade in 2015. Currently the two countries have agreed to speed up pragmatic cooperation to dovetail the two giant markets and promote regional economic integration. Both will advance infrastructure to give full play to the convergence of interests between India’s “eastward policy” and China’s openness to the West. The BCIM （Bangladesh， China， India and Myanmar） Economic Corridor， initiated by China and India， embodies the convergence of interests.
On the other hand， a challenge exists in the expansion of strategic space， and in diplomatic and defense practices guided by this. India， judging from its developing environment and the Asia-Pacific regional situation and power pattern， gives priority to the Asia-Pacific region. Its interaction with other Asia-Pacific countries like Japan and U.S.， to some degree， is a reasonable concern of China. Meanwhile， China’s restoration of the Maritime Silk Road and enhanced cooperation with Indian Oceanic countries is a strategic concern of India. Against the backdrop of the U.S.-dominated Asia-Pacific alliance system， the global strategic partnership between India and Japan is likely to advance. These mechanisms or arrangements are intended to target a rising China and restrain China’s influence. However， objectively speaking， they also reflect India’s pursuit of strategic independence and power balance， as well as economic development， promoting cultural influence and establishing the positive image of a democratic country.
In summary， under rational judgment， politically China and India have more cooperation than confrontation； economically mutual complementation between the two sides is bigger than competition； and culturally the two sides have more affinity than conflicts. It is not objective to partially emphasize mutual benefit or overstate divergences and conflicts. Bilateral development is predestined to face challenges， differences of opinion and goals， as well as expansion， intersection and collision of the two countries’ strategic interests. However， the reached consensus， mechanisms and signed agreements have laid foundations for a steady improvement of mutual political trust and healthy development. Decision-makers of both countries have emphasized that the bilateral relations are significant in global and strategic respects， reflecting their desire for a positive attitude to promote understanding and communication， effectively control disparities， and advance common interests.