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本文探讨了政府竞争格局下行业规模报酬递增的机制。我们发现,经典的规模报酬递增机制会导致垄断竞争条件下的厂商均衡数目减少,因而规模效率的提高与重复建设不可能同时出现。但是地方政府降低厂商固定成本的竞争却可以在重复建设的同时带来规模效率的提高,这就是本文所发现的政府竞争格局下行业规模报酬递增的第二种机制。我们通过DEA-VRS模型和DEA-Malmquist指数法初步证实了此过程。实证研究发现,在控制了干中学和货币外部性之后,地区行政垄断指数与规模效率的动态变动呈现显著的倒U形关系。
This paper explores the mechanism of increasing returns to scale in the government under the competitive landscape. We find that the classical mechanism of increasing returns to scale leads to a decrease in the equilibrium of firms under monopolistic competition. Therefore, it is impossible for both the increase of scale efficiency and the repetitive construction to occur simultaneously. However, the local government’s competition to reduce the fixed cost of manufacturers can bring about an increase in scale efficiency while duplicating construction. This is the second mechanism found in this paper that the industry returns to scale under the competitive landscape of government. We initially confirmed this process using the DEA-VRS model and the DEA-Malmquist index method. Empirical studies have found that after controlling for learning by doing and currency externalities, the dynamic changes in the administrative monopoly index and the scale efficiency in the region show a significant inverse U-shaped relationship.