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本文通过拓展经典的Bertrand对称双寡头博弈模型,运用勒拿指数测度电力市场绝对电量差价合约对发电商市场力的抑制效应。在发电商二次幂函数成本函数假定下,得到了双寡头对称发电商Bertrand博弈纳什均衡的解析表达式,并且发现发电商绝对量差价合约电量的增加会导致发电商均衡状态勒拿指数的可能取值范围会下降,因而具有抑制其市场力的效应。本文获得的拓展Bertrand博弈模型还将经典Bertrand博弈模型加以推广,得到二次幂函数成本函数条件下存在正均衡利润Bertrand的充分必要条件,为研究差价合约的其他相关问题提供了工具。
In this paper, by expanding the classic Bertrand symmetric duopoly game model, the Lehner index is used to measure the restraint effect on the market power of generators by the absolute electricity price difference contract in the electricity market. Under the assumption of cost function of power function of second power, the analytic expression of Bertrand game Nash equilibrium of duopoly symmetric power generator is obtained. And it is found that the increase of generator absolute quantity CFD contract will lead to the possible equilibrium of power producer. The range of values will decline, which has the effect of inhibiting its market power. The extended Bertrand game model obtained in this paper also extends the classical Bertrand game model to obtain the necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of positive equilibrium profit Bertrand under the cost function of quadratic power function, which provides a tool for studying other related issues of CFD.