公司治理问题已受到法学者和经济学者的广泛关注。在比较公司治理研究中,许多人花费大量的精力要么寻找所谓的最佳公司治理制度,要么将公司治理制度和一国的整个经济表现挂钩。我在本文提出了温和的反对意见。由于不可能精确衡量不同公司治理制度在降低因债务融资和股份融资而产生的代理成本方面的作用,我提出了在比较公司治理制度中采用一种机构竞争模式的理论。在这种机构竞争模式下,人们将注意力集中在公司的不同融资方法上。这样的取向会使债务融资和股份融资之间产生竞争。债务融资和股份融资之间的自由竞争会进一步形成因适应,试验和竞争而产生的公司治理下属制度。投资和贸易的全球化和人们对公司治理不断增长的知识会使得不同国家更容易地去建立和完善他们各自的公司治理下属制度。把注意力放在制度变迁的过程上,这一机构竞争模式具有预示发达国家公司治理制度改革的能力。这一模式对于衡量发展中国家的公司治理下属制度及为这些国家提供机构变革的方向都是非常有用的。 Corporate governance has received widespread attention from law scholars and economists. In comparing corporate governance research, many people spend a great deal of energy looking for the so-called best corporate governance system or linking the corporate governance system to the overall economic performance of a country. I have put forward mild opposition in this article. Given the impossibility of accurately measuring the role of different corporate governance systems in reducing the agency costs associated with debt financing and equity financing, I put forward the theory of adopting an institutional competition model for comparing corporate governance systems. In this institutional competition model, people focus their attention on different ways of financing a company. Such orientation creates competition between debt financing and equity financing. The free competition between debt financing and equity financing will further create a system of corporate governance under adaptation, experimentation and competition. The globalization of investment and trade and the growing knowledge of corporate governance will make it easier for different countries to establish and improve their respective systems of corporate governance. Focusing on the process of institutional change, this model of institutional competition has the ability to predict the reform of corporate governance in developed countries. This model is very useful in measuring the systems of corporate governance in developing countries and in providing institutional change for these countries.