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本文基于信息不对称理论,运用剩余收益评估模型控制IPO公司的内在价值,对我国创业板IPO过程中承销商的定价效率进行了实证研究。结果表明,在我国证券市场效率不高的背景下,不完善的声誉机制无法约束承销商的机会主义行为,导致承销商第三方认证功能弱化,发行价格偏离内在价值,不能有效降低发行人和投资者的信息不对称程度。承销商的机会主义行为造成发行人和承销商的利益趋同。在发行价格与抑价程度不存在显著关系的情况下,配合承销商的机会主义行为采取高报价策略争取配售份额是询价投资者的占优选择。
Based on the information asymmetry theory, this paper uses the residual income evaluation model to control the intrinsic value of IPO companies, and conducts an empirical research on the pricing efficiency of the underwriters in China’s IPO process. The results show that imperfect reputation mechanism can not restrain the underwriter opportunistic behavior under the condition of inefficient stock market in our country, resulting in weakening the third-party certification function of the underwriters and the deviation of the issue price from the intrinsic value, which can not effectively reduce the issuer and investment The degree of information asymmetry. Underwriters opportunistic behavior causes the interests of the issuer and underwriters convergence. Under the condition that there is no significant relationship between the issue price and the underpricing, taking the high bidding strategy in line with the opportunistic behavior of the underwriters to win the share placement is the predominant choice of the inquiry investor.