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本文基于Ramsey定价理论和认知价格响应假设构建了在阶梯电价基础上引入峰谷电价的政策评估模型,从定价机理角度回答了居民电价改革的理论和政策问题。本文发现,峰谷电价的引入会带来价格补贴和效率成本并存的福利效应“组合”特征,样本代表性用户在峰段会享受价格补贴,而在谷段则承担效率成本,综合效果是享受到约0.21~0.38元/KWh的价格补贴。价格补贴和效率成本均随用电量增加而增加,但变化趋势却不同。用户的用电量越多,享受补贴并非越多,而是终将消失,而且高消费用户在补贴低消费用户。这些定价特征反映出阶梯电价和峰谷电价之间存在效果冲突,难以提高电价效率和促进公平,因此全国进一步推广峰谷电价缺乏合理依据。坚持“保基本”理念的价格主管部门未能准确把握中国居民电力用户的需求特征及定价政策的实际效果。居民电价改革需在电力体制改革的框架下协调推进。居民用电定价机制的改革成效取决于市场的形成和竞争的引入,关键在于竞争性电力批发的结构重组和机制设计,而非管制定价方式的简单调整。
Based on Ramsey’s pricing theory and cognitive price response hypothesis, this paper constructs a policy evaluation model that introduces peak-valley electricity price based on the ladder price, and answers the theory and policy issues of residential electricity price reform from the perspective of pricing mechanism. This paper finds that the introduction of peak-to-valley electricity prices will bring about the combination of price subsidy and efficiency cost benefits and “combination” characteristics. Representative sample users will enjoy price subsidy in the peak section, and bear the efficiency cost in the valley section. It is to enjoy a price subsidy of about 0.21~0.38 yuan/KWh. Both the price subsidy and the efficiency cost increase with the increase in electricity consumption, but the trend of change is different. The more users use electricity, the more subsidies they enjoy, and the more they will eventually disappear. Moreover, high-consumption users are subsidizing low-consumption users. These pricing features reflect the effectiveness conflict between ladder price and peak-to-valley price, and it is difficult to increase the efficiency of electricity prices and promote fairness. Therefore, there is no reasonable basis for further promotion of peak-to-valley electricity prices throughout the country. The price supervisory department that adheres to the principle of “guaranteeing the basics” has failed to accurately grasp the demand characteristics of Chinese residents’ electricity users and the actual effects of pricing policies. Residents’ electricity price reforms must be coordinated and promoted within the framework of power system reform. The effectiveness of the reform of the residential electricity pricing mechanism depends on the formation of the market and the introduction of competition. The key lies in the structural restructuring and mechanism design of the competitive electricity wholesale, rather than the simple adjustment of the regulatory pricing mode.