Myanmar’s Presidential Election and the Country’s Future Political Trajectory

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  On March 15, 2016, Htin Kyaw, a senior member of the National League for Democracy (NLD), was elected the new president of Myanmar, securing an overwhelming majority of votes in Parliament. However, there are still many unanswered questions concerning Myanmar’s political transformation, such as: What role will the NLD’s leader Aung San Suu Kyi play in Myanmar’s new political structure, and how will she interact with the newly-elected president Htin Kyaw? What policies will the NLD implement and how will the country’s future political situation unfold?
  Negotiated Power Transition
  In the November 2015 national election, the NLD led by Aung San Suu Kyi achieved an overwhelming victory. However, under Myanmar’s current political structure, whether the NLD would smoothly take over power was still dependent to a great extent on the military’s support. Consequently, the NLD sought to achieve a smooth power transition through political negotiations. Shortly after the end of election, Suu Kyi requested a meeting with Myanmar’s then president Thein Sein, Parliament speaker Shwe Mann and commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing, and proposed discussing on the basis of national reconciliation the path to realizing the people’s will as manifested by their votes. Both the Presidential Office and the military responded positively to Suu Kyi’s suggestion, which also indicated that Suu Kyi and her party had learned the lesson of the 1990 general election. In that election, the NLD won more than 80 percent of the parliamentary seats. But when the military negotiated with Suu Kyi and her opposition party on the handover of power, the NLD leader insisted that the destiny of Ne Win and other military leaders should be decided by the people, which led to the breakdown of the negotiations and the military’s invalidation of the election.
  This time, after the election, Aung San Suu Kyi communicated with the military, Parliament, the government and ethnic minority groups to balance and coordinate the interests of different political forces. With the involved parties willing to put the national interest first, a peaceful power transition was possible.
  The inauguration of the NLD-nominated speakers and deputy speakers of Myanmar’s House of Representatives and House of Nationalities in early February 2016 marked the beginning of the NLD’s takeover of national political power. Except for the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Win Myint, a senior NLD member who is a Bamar, the other three leaders of the Houses are all from ethnic minority groups, and the two deputy speakers are both non-NLD members. The arrangement has sought to consider the interests of different parties, especially those of the military and the main ethnic groups in Myanmar.   On March 15, the two Houses of Myanmar’s legislature held a national conference and 69-year-old Htin Kyaw, a senior NLD member, became the first elected civilian president of the country since 1962 with 360 votes. Myint Swe, a retired lieutenant general, was elected first vice president, and the Chin NLD member Henry Van Thio was elected second vice president.
  On March 18, the President-elect Htin Kyaw submitted to Parliament a government re-organization plan, which downsized the number of ministries from 36 to 21 and the number of ministerial positions to 18 in order to streamline government organs, promote administrative efficiency and reduce fiscal spending. On March 24, Htin Kyaw formally submitted to Parliament the list of government members and ministers. On March 30, a handover ceremony was held, bringing to an end the power transition. The NLD’s taking office on April 1 heralded a new period in Myanmar’s history.
  Core Power Still in Military’s Grip
  Although the Suu Kyi-led NLD witnessed a peaceful power transition, it does not alter the fact that the military still plays a central role in Myanmar’s politics. The NLD has to deal with and try to conciliate the military in terms of interest allocation, as the core political power is still controlled by the military which will not easily concede it.
  At the ceremony held for the 71th anniversary of the Myanmar Army’s establishment on March 27, Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing emphasized that it is not time for the military to leave the political arena despite the historical election, and that the army still “plays a leading role in national politics.” What was noteworthy was neither Suu Kyi nor President-elect Htin Kyaw attended the ceremony.
  In fact, the military retains a strong grip on the core power and thus it still has a strong influence on Myanmar’s politics, which is explicitly protected in the country’s Constitution passed in 2008. The President has no power to rein in the military, and the military is guaranteed 25 percent of parliamentary seats which gives them sufficient power to veto any constitutional amendment and parliamentary motions.
  In terms of appointments, the military, under the 2008 Constitution, has the sole power to appoint the ministers of defense, home affairs, and border affairs, all of whom should be officers in service. This gives the military control of all the armed forces and police. More importantly, the military is constitutionally authorized to take over the power in an emergency, which secures it a privileged critical position in national politics. Additionally, the 11-member National Defense and Security Council, the highest decision-making body on military affairs under the Constitution, is biased toward the military. The military representatives in the Council include the commander-in-chief and deputy commander-in-chief, the military-nominated vice president, and the ministers of defense, home affairs and border affairs, the representatives from the ruling party include the president, the other vice president, the speakers of the two Houses, and the foreign minister. This 6:5 advantage in favor of the military gives the military an upper hand and thus veto power in the Council.   The election result was conceded by the military, who also expressed support for a peaceful power transition, but after the transition period, the NLD must carefully manage its relationship with the military and gradually promote political democratization and national reconciliation. Undoubtedly, the military is still an important force in national politics. Although it no longer directly holds power and its influence has weakened, it still holds on tight to the core power and so decides the nation’s future political trajectory. In fact, the civilian government is still a transition government under the military’s control, and the power obtained by the NLD-led government is mainly administrative.
  Challenges Ahead for the New Government
  There are multiple difficulties facing the new NLD-led government. Besides the internal problems in terms of personnel, organization and institution building, and its relationship with the military, there exist many other unprecedented challenges that will affect the prospects of the NLD-led government.
  First, how will Aung San Suu Kyi play her role in the new government? In the few months between the parliamentary election and Htin Kyaw’s inauguration, Suu Kyi expressed on multiple occasions her intention to rule “above the president.” For example, Suu Kyi told reporters before the election that while another member of her National League for Democracy party would hold the presidential title if the NLD won the election, “I’ll make all the proper and important decisions” and “be above the president.” “I’ll run the government…the Constitution says nothing about being ‘above the president’.” She insisted on the legality of her plan, and after the election, Suu Kyi once again told the media that she would run the country “above whoever she picks to be the president.” She stressed that the new president should follow her orders and the NLD’s decisions. She said that as the NLD’s leader, she is the one with the final say. It was thus speculated that Suu Kyi would stay as NLD chairperson and govern the country from that position.
  Nonetheless, Suu Kyi’s name appeared on the proposed list of cabinet members that Htin Kyaw submitted to Parliament on March 24, indicating that she wanted to be involved in specific government affairs. When the appointments were released on March 30, Suu Kyi simultaneously took four ministerial-level positions—Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Education, Minister of Electricity and Energy, and Minister of the President’s Office—which made her a “super minister.” This arrangement suggested that, on the one hand, the NLD could not find other qualified candidates for the portfolios, and on the other that Suu Kyi wanted to handle the affairs of the above-mentioned ministries in person. There are indeed multiple tasks facing the government in the sphere of education and energy, and the position of Minister of the President’s Office is responsible for facilitating coordination between the government and the president. And as foreign minister, Suu Kyi would be well-positioned to promote Myanmar’s diplomacy, and more importantly, it qualifies her as a member of the National Defense and Security Council, the paramount body in Myanmar’s politics.   There were no difficulties for Suu Kyi in terms of her interaction with the president. After all, Htin Kyaw was picked primarily for his loyalty to Suu Kyi, and the two trust and well understand each other. Therefore, in principle, the two will work in the same direction on major policies and decisions without any conflicts.
  According to the Constitution, however, Suu Kyi had to give up her parliamentary seat on taking up ministerial positions, and she is not be allowed to participate in party affairs, which it was suggested would mean she would have to resign from the NLD chairmanship. This is undoubtedly a challenge for Suu Kyi.
  The second challenge facing the NLD is constitutional amendment. It has been Suu Kyi’s long-time political ambition to become President, and she once indicated that a constitutional amendment process would be activated if the NLD won the election in order to allow her to qualify for the presidency and deprive the military of political power. The NLD stated many times that constitutional amendment was the top priority after winning the election. However, there has been no breakthrough in this respect so far despite the NLD and Suu Kyi’s continuous efforts. The new government took office on April 1, it remains to be seen if the NLD will continue to push for constitutional amendment, and how.
  The existing threshold for amendment under the 2008 Constitution is the consent of at least 75 percent of parliamentary members. This guarantees the military the power to veto any amendment as it possesses non-elected seats in Parliament that amount to 25 percent of the votes. Obviously, the NLD has to cooperate with the military and seek approval from the latter if it hopes to revise the Constitution, especially the provision stipulating the President’s qualification. However, as long as the military and the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) that it supports cling to the current Constitution, the NLD cannot have complete control over the regime even as the leading party. If the NLD insists on amendment at any cost, it risks touching the military’s core interests, which may cause conflicts and threaten the hard-won stability of the nation.
  Last but not least, how will national reconciliation be promoted? Suu Kyi has indicated on many occasions that the issue will be a first priority for the NLD-led government. A national peace agreement could be reached through political negotiation in the spirit of the historic Panglong Agreement.   Over the past five years, the Thein Sein government actively promoted national reconciliation besides economic and political reforms. The central government reached a ceasefire protocol with the armed fighters of eight ethnic groups on October 15, 2015, but there are still more than 10 ethnic groups with armed fighters that have not signed such an agreement with the government. Even during the recent national election, sporadic armed conflicts were witnessed between government troops and ethnic armed groups. However, even a ceasefire is just a small step toward national reconciliation, and there is a long way to go before a nationwide peace agreement and reconciliation are achieved. It remains uncertain whether the NLD will continue pushing the cause on the current basis or redesign the political negotiations. Moreover, cooperation with the military is also needed to reach a peace agreement, otherwise the new government will not achieve real reconciliation with the ethnic armed groups.
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