通过建立演化博弈模型分析集群内企业展示或隐藏创新行为演化的过程特征和均衡状态。当产业集群内的知识溢出效应增大时,系统收敛于(展示创新,展示创新)状态的概率增大,即产业集群的企业均坚持展示创新行为,产业集群朝着良性的状态发展。当产业集群内的模仿行为给创新企业带来的损失增大时,系统收敛于(隐藏创新,隐藏创新)状态的概率增大,不利于产业集群内的知识溢出,最终使产业集群走向衰退。针对促进产业集群内企业选择展示创新行为的路径,提出相应的建议。 Through the establishment of evolutionary game model, the intra-cluster enterprises demonstrate or hide the process characteristics and equilibrium of evolution of innovative behavior. When the knowledge spillover effect in the industrial cluster increases, the probability of the system converging to the state of (demonstrating innovation, demonstrating innovation) increases, that is, the enterprises in the industrial cluster insist on demonstrating innovative behavior and the industrial clusters move towards a benign state. When the imitations in the industrial clusters bring more losses to innovative enterprises, the probability of the system converging to the state of hidden innovation and hidden innovation increases, which is unfavorable to the knowledge spillover within the industrial clusters and eventually leads to the decline of the industrial clusters. In order to promote the choice of enterprises in industrial clusters to demonstrate the innovative behavior of the path, put forward corresponding suggestions.