中央政府对地方政府激励不足,激励模式不合适,使得地方政府财政资金投入缺乏是导致农村水利基础设施供给严重不足的根本原因,要吸引更多的地方政府财政资金投入农村水利建设项目需要设计以投入为导向的更为合适的激励机制。通过建立委托代理模型,研究了依据地方政府财政投入量进行激励的激励合约设计问题,得出了地方政府最优投入规模、中央政府激励系数以及最优激励合约。 Incentives by the central government for local governments are not enough, incentive mode is not suitable, making the lack of local government financial capital is leading to a serious shortage of water supply infrastructure in rural areas, the root cause, to attract more local government funds into rural water conservancy construction projects need to design Input-oriented and more appropriate incentive mechanism. Through the establishment of the principal-agent model, the design of incentive contract based on the amount of local government financial investment is studied. The optimal investment scale of local government, the incentive coefficient of central government and the optimal incentive contract are obtained.