论文部分内容阅读
本文以万科、三星为例,考察了两种不同股权结构背后隐藏的委托代理问题,以及产生这种问题的原因。万科和三星分别代表了两种典型的股权结构,一个是股权结构分散,职业经理人作为实际控制人的企业;一个是金字塔式股权结构,控制权牢牢掌握在大股东手中的家族企业。前者面临经理人代理问题,后者存在着严重的大股东隧道效应。本文通过剖析两类委托代理问题及产生的根源,从而为上市公司的理性治理、股权结构的优化、内外部监督的加强提供参考。
This article takes Vanke and Samsung as examples and examines the principal-agent problems hidden behind two different ownership structures and the reasons for such problems. Vanke and Samsung represent two typical shareholding structures, one is the decentralized ownership structure, professional managers as the actual controller of the enterprise; one is the pyramidal ownership structure, the control of the firm firmly in the hands of major shareholders of the family business. The former faces the problem of manager agency, which has the serious tunneling effect of major shareholders. By analyzing the two types of principal-agent problems and their causes, this paper provides a reference for the rational governance of listed companies, the optimization of ownership structure and the strengthening of internal and external supervision.