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科斯定理是新制度主义经济学的重要理论基石,它阐述了产权界定与资源配置之间的关系。科斯于《社会成本问题》(1960)一文中对该定理作了阐述。他在该文中设想了一个“农夫与养牛者”的案例来展开他的分析。走散的牛群会损害邻近土地的谷物生长,即养牛者的生产活动对于农夫的生产活动存在外部影响。若法院裁定养牛者对损害负有责任,则养牛者会将受损谷物的价值视为自己的生产成本,从而决定最佳养牛规模。若法院裁定养牛者对损害不负责任,在完全竞争条件下,牛群规模和谷物产量均不会变化。因为农夫会从自身利润最大化角度考虑,与养牛者达成协议,付给其赎金以控制牛群规模。理性的养牛者将会扩大牛群头数,而损失的赎金视为自己的机会成本,从而确定最佳养牛规模。由此,科斯得出“如果定价制度的运行毫无成本,最终的结果(产值最大化)是不受法律状况影响的”。当然,这两种截然相反的产权界定改变了养牛者和农夫之间的收入分配。较之第二种情况,在第一种产权界定条件下养牛者的收入减少,因为他承担了由外部性造成的全部损失。对于农夫而言,情况则相反。因此,不同的产权界定改变了经济个体之间的收入分配。一部分经济学家由此关注起了在解决外部性问题中的公平问题以及公平与效率的关系。
Coase theorem is an important theoretical cornerstone of neo-institutionalism economics, which expounds the relationship between property rights definition and resource allocation. Coase described this theorem in his article “Social Costs” (1960). In this article he envisions a case of “farmer and cattleman” to start his analysis. The sheared herd will damage the grain growth of the neighboring land, ie the production activity of the cattle-raiser has an external influence on the farmer’s production activity. If the court ruled that the cattle-raiser is responsible for the damage, the cattle-raiser would regard the value of the damaged grain as their own cost of production and thus determine the optimal size of the cattle-raising. If the court ruled that the cattle-raiser is not responsible for the damage, the herd size and grain yield will not change under complete competition. Because farmers would consider maximizing their own profits, they reached an agreement with the cattle-handlers to pay their ransom to control the herd size. Rational cow-keepers will expand the number of herds, while loss of ransom will be their own opportunity cost to determine the optimal size of cattle-raising. From this, Coase concludes that “If the pricing system runs at no cost, the end result (maximizing output) is not affected by the law.” Of course, these two diametrically opposed definitions of property change the distribution of income between the cattle-raiser and the farmer. Compared with the second case, the income of cattle-raising people under the definition of the first property right is reduced because he assumed the entire loss caused by externalities. For the farmer, the opposite is true. Therefore, the definition of different property rights has changed the distribution of income among economic individuals. As a result, some economists have paid attention to the issue of equity in solving the issue of externality and the relationship between equity and efficiency.