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本文运用中国地级市1996年至2010年的主要经济信息和历任821位市长个人详细信息的面板数据,考察了中国地级市市长的晋升机制。我们发现如下结果:(1)纵向来看,中国各级官员的升迁并不存在一个全国统一的晋升机制。与省级官员面临强大的经济绩效激励不同,经济绩效对地级市市长的晋升有着负的但有限的影响;(2)横向来看,地级市市长的晋升机制在区域之间存在一定的差异。与中、西部地区不同,经济绩效对东部地区市长的晋升有着正的但有限的影响;(3)与年龄类似,市长的任期对其晋升可能性存在着非线性的影响。当使用其他经济绩效指标进行检验时,我们的研究结论仍然成立。
This article examines the promotion mechanism of the mayors of prefecture-level cities in China by using the panel data of the main economic information of China’s prefecture-level cities from 1996 to 2010 and the personal details of 821 mayors. We found the following results: (1) From a vertical perspective, there is no single nationwide promotion mechanism for the promotion of Chinese officials at all levels. Unlike provincial officials who face strong incentives for economic performance, economic performance has a negative but limited impact on the promotion of prefecture-level mayors; (2) Laterally, the promotion mechanism for the mayors of prefecture-level cities exists between regions Certain differences. In contrast to the central and western regions, economic performance has a positive but limited impact on the mayor’s promotion in the eastern region; (3) Similar to age, the tenure of the mayor has a non-linear effect on the promotion potential. When using other economic performance indicators for testing, our findings still hold.