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文章以2010-2013年沪深两市的上市公司为对象,研究了董事长和总经理的变更对盈余管理程度的影响,并进一步探索了股东和董事会治理差异对两者关系的作用机制。结果表明:管理者在正常离职前的一年至两年内会进行盈余操纵,且正常变更前一年的盈余管理程度比变更前两年高。另外,股东和董事会治理水平的差异会显著影响管理者变更与盈余管理的关系,即股权集中度较低或董事会规模较小的情况下,管理者进行盈余管理的程度更大。
Based on the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in 2010-2013, the article studies the influence of changes of chairman and general manager on earnings management, and further explores the mechanism of the difference between shareholder and board governance on the relationship between the two. The results show that managers will conduct earnings maneuver within one year to two years before the normal departure, and the earnings management of the year prior to the normal change is higher than the two years prior to the change. In addition, the difference of governance level between the shareholders and the board of directors can significantly affect the relationship between managers’ changes and earnings management. That is, under the condition of lower equity concentration or smaller board, managers have a greater degree of earnings management.