This paper investigates a power control problem in a jamming system, where a separate smart jammer is deployed to ensure the communication se-curity of the legal user. However, due to power leak-age, the smart jammer may incur unintentional inter-ference to legal users. The key is how to suppress ille-gal communication while limit the negative impact on legal user. A jamming counter measure Stackelberg game is formulated to model the jamming power con-trol dynamic of the system. The smart jammer acts as a leader to sense and interfere illegal communications of the illegal user, while the illegal user acts as a follower. In the game, the impact of uncertain channel informa-tion is taken into account. According to whether ille-gal user considers the uncertain channel information, we investigate two scenarios, namely, illegal user can obtain statistical distribution and accurate information of interference channel gain and its own cost, respec-tively. This work not only proposes a jamming counter measure iterative algorithm to update parameters, but also gives two solutions to obtain the Stackelberg equi-librium (SE). The power convergence behaviours un-der two scenarios are analyzed and compared. Addi-tionally, brute force is used to verify the accuracy of the SE value further.