我国中央与地方之间的关系在行政体制和政党制度的双重规定下,具有鲜明的“单一制”和中央集权特征。近些年,随着中央政府权力的不断下放,特别是经济权力的下放,地方政府有了更加明确的利益诉求,“地方主义”日益严重。地方政府出于自身利益考量,常常会对中央的部分政策选择性执行、表面执行、扭曲执行甚至拒绝执行,中央与地方之间出现了明显的制度堕距。为了维护国家整体利益,打破“地方主义”割裂局面,保证政策执行畅通,中央政府不断地对中央与地方之间的纵向权力配置进行改革。然而,通过对改革的手段和方法进行分析发现,中央与地方关系的改革出现了内卷化现象。只有走出内卷化困境,才能真正解决中央与地方关系中所存在的问题。 Under the dual provisions of the administrative system and the party system, the relations between the central and the local governments in our country have distinct characteristics of “unitary system” and centralized power. In recent years, with the continuous decentralization of power of the central government, especially the decentralization of economic power, local governments have a more clear interest demands, and “localism” is becoming increasingly serious. For their own consideration, local governments often selectively implement some of the policies of the Central Government, implement them on a face-to-face basis, distort or even refuse to implement them, and there is a clear institutional fall between the central government and local governments. In order to safeguard the overall interests of the country, break the “localism” fragmentation and ensure the smooth implementation of policies, the Central Government has continuously carried out reforms in the allocation of vertical power between the central and local governments. However, through the analysis of the means and methods of reform, we find that the reform of the relations between the central and the local governments has become an issue of the phenomenon of “curl”. Only when we get out of the dilemma of becoming curbed can we really solve the problems that exist in the relations between the central and the local governments.