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道德判断与道德动机的关系是元伦理学领域长久不息的争论话题,其焦点在于如何看待无道德主义者——作出真诚的道德判断但是不具有相应动机的人。动机内在主义认为这种情况无法设想,外在主义则认为这恰恰构成了内在主义的反例。近来,有学者受到神经生理学研究的启发,认为大脑受损后产生的不道德行为构成了无道德主义者的新证据,但反对者认为,这种科学证据无助于解决旧有争论。本文试图对道德动机探究与这种科学证据的关系作出分析,认为在道德动机探究与科学证据的关系上应持有一种平衡的立场:新的科学证据确实无法一劳永逸地解决道德动机争论,但它们可能带来的启发没有理由被忽视。
The relationship between moral judgment and moral motivation is a long-running topic of debate in the field of meta-ethics, with a focus on how non-ethics are treated - those who make a true moral judgment but do not have the corresponding motivation. Motivational internalism holds that this situation can not be envisaged, while extrinsicism assumes that this constitutes exactly the counter-example of internalism. Recently, some scholars have been inspired by the neurophysiological research that the unethical behavior that occurs after brain damage constitutes new evidence for non-moralists, but opponents argue that such scientific evidence will not help solve the old controversy. This paper attempts to analyze the relationship between moral motivation and scientific evidence and holds that there should be a balanced position on the relationship between moral motivation and scientific evidence: the new scientific evidence can not solve the moral motivation debate once and for all, There is no reason why they should be ignored.