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本文采用流行的终极所有权方法对我国上市公司大股东控制私利进行了量化,并在此基础上采用2004和2005年1099家上市公司的样本数据检验了公司治理状况对于大股东控制私利的约束效果。我们的研究表明,公司治理整体上与大股东控制私利呈现倒U型的曲线关系,这种公司治理的总体效果是监事会治理和经理层治理两种治理机制对于大股东控制私利作用的叠加,除此之外的四种治理机制并没有起到约束大股东控制私利的显著作用。此外我们还发现,不同的公司特征也在不同程度上影响着大股东控制私利。
Based on the sample data of 1099 listed companies in 2004 and 2005, this paper tests the restraint effect of corporate governance on the control of private interests by majority shareholders by using the popular method of ultimate ownership. Our research shows that the corporate governance as a whole has an inverted U-shaped curve with the majority shareholder controlling private interests. The overall effect of such corporate governance is that the two governance mechanisms, the supervisory board and the management board, supervise the self-interest of major shareholders, except The four governance mechanisms beyond this did not play a significant role in restraining major shareholders from controlling private interests. In addition, we also found that different characteristics of the company also affect the majority shareholder to control the private interests to varying degrees.