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以A股上市公司2003~2013年的数据为样本,基于贷款契约的视角,研究了企业自由现金流过度投资的代理问题。研究结果表明:贷款契约对自由现金流滥用的治理效应总体上不显著;在制度环境较好的地区,贷款契约的治理效应较显著,贷款利率的提高强化了贷款契约的治理效应,而在制度环境较差的地区,抵押贷款比例的提高强化了贷款契约的治理效应;有效监督主体数量越多,贷款契约的治理效应就越强;股份制商业银行没有比国有银行表现出更强的治理效应。
Taking the data of A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2013 as a sample, this paper studies the agency problem of free cash flow over-investment in enterprises based on the perspective of loan contract. The results show that: the lending contract has a negligible effect on the management of free cash flow abuse; in areas with better institutional environment, the lending contract’s governance effect is more significant; the increase of lending rate strengthens the lending contract’s governance effect; In areas with poor environment, the increase in the proportion of mortgages has strengthened the governance effect of loan contracts. The more the number of effective supervisors, the stronger the governance effect of loan contracts. The joint-stock commercial banks showed no stronger governance effects than state-owned banks.