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文章基于信息不对称和委托代理理论,研究了融资结构对上市公司财务性投资的影响。研究发现:公司是否进行财务性投资主要取决于公司管理者投资所得到的私人利润、现有股东的监管力度以及对经营管理人员的激励大小;随着公司负债的增加,公司进行财务性投资的可能性减小;而当公司外部投资者看好财务性投资时,利用股权融资的公司进行财务投资的可能性大。
Based on information asymmetry and principal-agent theory, the article studies the influence of financing structure on the financial investment of listed companies. The study finds that whether a company makes financial investment depends mainly on the private profit obtained from the company’s manager’s investment, the supervision of the existing shareholders and the incentive to the managers. As the company’s debt increases, the company makes financial investment The possibility is reduced; and when the external investors in the company are optimistic about the financial investment, the companies that use equity financing are more likely to make financial investments.