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在对称双头垄断期权博弈模型的基础上讨论了利润流现值和沉没投资成本为梯形模糊数的情形并进行了扩展,对企业技术创新投资策略进行了分析.构建了模糊环境下追随者、领导者的投资价值和投资临界值的模糊表达式并进行数值分析.分析表明:模糊环境下仍存在最优投资策略,随着梯形模糊数的沉没投资成本期望值的增加,企业的投资价值下降而投资临界值上升.为模糊环境下投资决策提供了一种解释.
On the basis of the symmetric two-monopoly option game model, the present value of profit flow and the investment cost of sunk investment are trapezoidal fuzzy numbers, and the investment strategy of technological innovation of enterprises is analyzed.The followers, The fuzzy expression of the leaders’ investment value and the investment critical value, and carries on the numerical analysis. The analysis shows that there still exists the optimal investment strategy in the fuzzy environment. With the increase of the expected value of the sunk investment cost of the trapezoidal fuzzy number, the investment value of the enterprise declines, Investment thresholds rise, providing an explanation for investment decisions in a fuzzy environment.