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本文从风险转化的理论视角出发,以社会博弈论为基础分析框架,解释市场治理过程中的一组颇具反差意味却又稳定重复的现象,即地方政府市场角色的多重面向、政府-市场边界的变动不居和经济风险分担规则的不确定性等。研究表明,市场转型与法律缺失的内在矛盾、经济治理与政治稳定的任务压力、契约原则与官民关系的观念基础,是地方政府治理市场所面对的三维制度环境。这些不同维度的制度环境结合起来,衍生了系列后果:(1)市场交易的经济风险容易向政府面对的政治风险转化,地方政府需要在经济治理激励和政治风险约束的作用下选择对于市场的治理结构;(2)政绩信号发送机制、经济风险转移机制、政治风险弱化机制的搭配组合影响着政府与市场的边界变动;(3)多元并存的合法性基础,以及地方政府和市场主体利益博弈背后的多重制度逻辑,是经济风险分担规则不确定状态的结构性来源。
From the theoretical perspective of risk transformation, this article analyzes the framework of social game theory based on the analysis of a rather contradictory and consistent phenomenon in the process of market governance, that is, the multi-faceted role of local government market, the government-market boundary Uncertainty and uncertainty of economic risk sharing rules. The research shows that the inherent contradictions between market transition and law absence, the task pressure of economic governance and political stability, the contractual principle and the concept foundation of the relationship between government and the public are the three-dimensional institutional environment that the local government faces. The institutional environment of these different dimensions combine to produce a series of consequences: (1) The economic risk of market transactions can easily be transformed into the political risk faced by the government, and local governments need to select the market risk for the market under the constraints of economic governance incentives and political risks Governance structure; (2) the combination of political signal transmission mechanism, economic risk transfer mechanism and political risk weakening mechanism affects the border change between government and market; (3) the legitimacy foundation of multiple coexistence and the game of interest between local governments and market players The multiple system logic behind is a structural source of the uncertain state of economic risk sharing rules.