论文部分内容阅读
2010年末,“封杀京东”现象表明制造商正面临着是否要引入网络渠道以及如何协调传统渠道和网络渠道的挑战。针对这个问题,本文使用主从博弈框架研究了在零售渠道服务影响市场需求情况下制造商引入网络渠道产生的效应与决策条件。研究表明,当服务弹性相对较高时,制造商的最优策略是不引入网络渠道;当服务弹性较低时,制造商应该引入网络渠道,但引入需要特定的时机,即价格转移系数超过特定水平时制造商引入网络渠道才能增加自身的利润。随着网络消费者越来越多,价格转移系数将不断增长,多数制造商都将最终引入网络渠道,并引发网络渠道的巨大增长。最后,通过数值仿真对相关结论进行了检验。
By the end of 2010, the phenomenon of “blocking the Jingdong” showed that manufacturers are facing the challenge of introducing online channels and how to coordinate traditional channels and online channels. In response to this problem, this paper uses the master-slave game framework to study the effects and decision-making conditions for manufacturers to introduce online channels under the impact of retail channel services on market demand. The research shows that when the service elasticity is relatively high, the optimal strategy of the manufacturer is not to introduce the network channel. When the service elasticity is low, the manufacturer should introduce the network channel, but the introduction of the need for a specific time, that is, the price transfer coefficient exceeds a certain Horizontal manufacturers to introduce online channels to increase their own profits. As more and more online consumers, the price transfer factor will continue to grow, most manufacturers will eventually lead to the Internet channel, and trigger a tremendous growth in Internet channels. Finally, the relevant conclusions are tested by numerical simulation.