斯特劳森正确地指出,罗素把限定摹状词的存在性预设当作存在性断定,进而把一个违反存在性预设因而没有真值的语句看作一个假命题,这是对预设和断定的混淆。笔者进一步指出,唐奈兰把由世界语境和交流语境造成的关于适合于摹状词的对象是否存在的差别,错误地归结为,在适合于一个摹状词的对象不存在的情况下关于该摹状词的归属性用法和指称性用法的差别。笔者认为,无论归属性用法还是指称性用法,只有在适合于那个摹状词的对象存在的情况下才有指称;关键在于,适合于那个摹状词的对象在不同的语境下可能是不同的。 Strawson rightly pointed out that Russell treats the existential presuppositions of definite descriptions as existential assertions and treats a statement that violates existential preconditions as there is no truth as a false proposition, And conclusive confusion. The author further points out that Donnellan mistook the difference between the objects suitable for the description words caused by the context of the world and the communicative context in the absence of an object suitable for a description word Differences between attributive usage and referential usage of this description. The author believes that no matter whether the attributive usage or the referential usage only has an allegation in the presence of an object that suits the descriptive word, the key point is that the object suitable for the descriptive word may be different in different contexts of.