COVID-19 Pandemic and G20’s Crisis Response

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  Dean and Distinguished Professor, Institute of Marine Development,
  Ocean University of China
  Associate Professor, Party School of CPC Zhejiang Provincial Committee
  As a unique form of international cooperation, the original objective of the G20 at its formation is to prevent financial crisis from happening; its main mission also includes timely responding to and effectively managing the crisis. Since its official launching in 1999, the G20 has taken a journey of “crisis response” for 21 years. At present, the G20 is coping with the COVID-19 pandemic and promoting global economic recovery and development. Comparing the global pandemic of COVID-19 of 2020 with the global financial crisis of 2008, both are evidently compound crises, i.e. structural overlay of multiple and mutually interactive crises. During the global COVID-19 pandemic this time around, issues like climate crisis and geopolitical conflicts have not abated for the sustained pandemic, but rather “de-globalization” and world disorder have conversely aggravated tension. An unprecedented crisis makes it more necessary for countries to make joint response.
  The Role of G20 as a Global
  Crisis Responder
  The global financial crisis of 2008 evolved from the subprime crisis of the United States became one of the most serious financial crises in the world economic history. To respond to the crisis, the Bush administration of the US approaching the end of its term of office took the initiative to call for the first G20 Summit, whereby the G20 was upgraded from the original international conference mainly of economic ministers such as finance ministers and central bank governors to a top political leaders’ meeting of major economies of the world. The first four G20 summits (from 2008 to 2010) were mainly to contain the global financial crisis, being emergency ones as a “crisis responder”. Though the Republican Party lost the US presidential election of 2008, the succeeding Democratic Obama administration did not overturn the G20 policy of the Bush administration but rather continued and strengthened the latter’s high regard of the G20. On responding to the financial crisis, both parties of the US were unprecedentedly unified in policy and action.
  It was the main domestic and international challenge for the Obama administration of the US to respond to the financial crisis. Shortly after the G20 Washington and London Summits, the Obama administration hosted the G20 Pittsburg Summit in September 2009, which played a crucial role in crisis management. The Summit came up with a G20 leaders’ statement, a document carrying high historical value in global economic governance. Not only did the document once again reiterate the assessments that the global financial crisis was “the greatest challenge to the world economy in our generation”, that “global output was contracting at pace not seen since the 1930s”, and that “people worried that the world was on the edge of a depression”, it also avowed to take unprecedented globally coordinated action to deal with the global financial crisis. Besides, the Pittsburg Summit promoted the upgrading of G20 from being a “crisis response mechanism” to a “long-term mechanism” of global economic governance, and designated the G20 for the first time as “the premier forum for international economic cooperation”.   In June 2010, following the US, Canada hosted G20 Toronto Summit. The Toronto Summit came up with a declaration which stressed that “the (financial) crisis is still widely felt”. In November 2010, the G20 Seoul Summit Leaders’ Declaration pointed out that the G20 had “worked with unprecedented cooperation to break the dramatic fall in the global economy” as a summary of the past four Summits, which signified that the G20’s role as a “crisis responder” had come to a temporary conclusion.
  The COVID-19 pandemic that broke out in 2020 seriously impacted on global economic development and international interconnectivity. The UN Secretary-General António Guterres observed that the COVID-19 pandemic is “the most serious global threat” since the Second World War. In order to cope with the pandemic unseen in a century, the G20 as an existing “long-term governance mechanism” has once more play a central role in responding to a global crisis.
  On March 26, 2020, Saudi Arabia as rotating president of the G20 hosted an emergency Extraordinary G20 Leaders’ Summit on COVID-19, which itself stood for “crisis response”, and as its Statement on COVID-19 emphasized, “the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic is a powerful reminder of our interconnectedness and vulnerabilities”. Chinese President Xi Jinping made an important speech at the Extraordinary Summit titled Working Together to Defeat the COVID-19 Outbreak, calling on “all G20 members to take collective actions”, “develop a G20 action plan in response to COVID-19” and “promptly set up communication mechanisms and institutional arrangements for anti-epidemic macro policy coordination”.
  Over the past decade and more, leaders’ statements and crisis response measures of the G20 have been put to practice mainly through existing global international institutions (international organizations). The UN and its specialized agencies are important participants of the G20 system. The World Health Organization (WHO) at the center of global health governance incorporated the proposal of the G20 Extraordinary Summit and hosted an emergency G20 health ministers virtue meeting, at which WHO Director-General Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus observed that this “unprecedented global health crisis” called for global response, primarily for the G20 countries to work together. He made a series of important proposals to G20 member countries to stimulate economy, to relieve debts, to increase the production and equitable distribution of essential supplies, and to remove trade barriers that put health workers and their patients at risk.   During its G20 presidency, Saudi Arabia has, on top of hosting G20 health ministers meeting, completed all ministerial meetings as designated by the G20, almost all of which were centered on responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, laying a solid foundation for the G20 Riyadh Summit later on themed responding to the COVID-19 pandemic and restarting the global economy. Besides, the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors meeting underlined its central role in the G20 process, its new international debt arrangements like the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) having made important contributions to the fight against COVID-19 pandemic. It is worth noting that ten years into building a “long-term mechanism” for global governance, the G20 has once again underlined its main function of “crisis response” and played a key role.
  The COVID-19 Pandemic and
  the Development of G20 Reform
  In face of an unprecedented global crisis, the process of global governance as represented by the G20 stands at a historic crossroads. The goal of the G20 is “a long-term (global) governance mechanism”, to which “crisis response” is all along the key. As above said, since Saudi Arabia held the Extraordinary Leaders’ Summit via video, the G20 has played an important role in responding to the pandemic. However, it is also worth noting that affected by factors such as the US continuing to weaken and even attack multilateral cooperation and the US inaction in the G20 since the Trump administration came to power, the central place of G20 in multilateral cooperation has been continuously impacted. At the initial stage of responding to the pandemic, members of G20 did not cooperate against coronavirus like they had responding to the global financial crisis yesteryear but rather each did things in its own way, affecting the effects of early efforts to prevent and control the epidemic.
  Be it “crisis response” or “long-term governance”, the effectiveness of the G20 depends on macro policy coordination between major economies of the world. To take concrete coordination of macro policy for a yardstick, one cannot find many a result of G20’s coordination in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. Even though since the outbreak of the pandemic, various countries worldwide have spent US$15 trillion fiscal funding on supporting economy, stabilizing jobs and escaping depression, the actual effect is less than satisfactory. In monetary policy, major economies are in pursuit of negative interest rate policy in lack of true international coordination.   In essence, the G20 is great power multilateralism. The level of such cooperation depends on relatively healthy or benign interactive relations between great powers old and new. However, since 2017, major reversal has happened to US foreign policy. The Trump administration has played up opposition to “globalism” at home, pursued unilateralism abroad, and stubbornly insisted on “America First”. Having continued to withdraw from international treaties and institutions, it has severely damaged the existing global governance system. To a certain degree, the policy reversal of the Trump administration has downgraded the G20 from a platform of great power cooperation to an arena of great power rivalry, which is underlined by the fact that the differences between the US and other G20 members have become increasingly prominent.
  However, though the Trump administration has successively withdrawn from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the WHO, it does not withdraw from the G20. Mr. Trump himself has participated four G20 summits. But his participation has not strengthened G20 cooperation. Rather, it has brought crisis and resistance to the G20 summits. For one, on the G20 Hamburg Summit, Mr. Trump insisted on withdrawing from the Paris Agreement and was thus isolated by other G20 members, resulting in the fact that on climate change, G20 became “G19+1”. For another, during the G20 Buenos Aires Summit, Mr. Trump signed the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) to replace the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that had been operative for 24 years, an action sending a negative signal of challenging the global trade governance system with the WTO as the mainstay. In December 2019, right after the G20 Osaka Summit, Mr. Trump exercised veto, leading to the stoppage of WTO’s dispute settlement regime the Appellate Body for the first time since it became operative in 1995. At the G20 Riyadh Summit, Mr. Trump showed up briefly without forgetting to talk about “Vaccinate America First”, in sharp contrast to the G20’s spirit of global cooperation.
  2020 is strikingly similar to 2008, in the sense that both see the outbreak of global crises which happen to coincide with major shifts of political cycle in the US. Given the unique position of the US in the global economic and political pattern and in the global governance system, changes in US domestic politics and foreign policy will continue to profoundly affect international response to global crisis in the future.   It is worth noting that it is very likely for the new US administration to value the role of G20 once again. Former US Treasury Secretary, Professor Larry Summers of Harvard University has already recommended the new US administration to have full consultation with the Italian government for holding an emergency G20 meeting at the beginning of 2021, aiming to enhance the role of the G20 in responding the COVID crisis. Going by the previous experience of responding to the global financial crisis, it is necessary for the G20 to designate the process between 2021 and 2022 as a period of “crisis response”.
  As the Leaders’ Declaration of G20 Riyadh Summit emphasized, “supporting the multilateral trading system is now as important as ever”. “We will continue to work to ensure a level playing field to foster an enabling business environment”, “commit to ensuring that global transportation routes and supply chains remain open, safe, and secure”, and “continue to explore concrete ways to facilitate the movement of people in a way that does not impede our efforts to protect public health”. This Declaration signals that G20 is returning to “crisis response”, i.e. the development process of G20 will take “crisis response” for its main direction for a period of time to come.
  Prospect of G20’s
  Crisis Response
  in Post COVID Era
  In the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis, the G20 came into being in 1999; as the International Financial Crisis of 2008 swept the globe, its summit mechanism was created to meet the situation; and as the fallout of the International Financial Crisis of 2008 continued and produced results in concentration between 2009 and 2010, the G20 summit advanced institutional construction. The process of G20 development illustrates that the occurrence of major crises, their fallout and reflections and summarization on them all this can become a historic opportunity to improve the institutional construction and governance capacity of the organization. Looking from the angle of connecting history with reality, the G20 with more than twenty years of experience is to embrace a critical historic juncture of its institutional innovation.
  First, the COVID-19 pandemic has brought about a crisis, which objectively creates conditions of “opportune time” for the G20 to play a still greater role in global governance. Great changes unseen in a century meeting a great pandemic unseen in a century will necessarily bring about profound and far-reaching effect to the world economy and politics, whose mid and long-term results are yet to appear. For a G20 that has grown into “a primary platform of global economic governance” and aspires to play an even greater role in governance for broader global issues, this is both an unprecedented severe test and an important historic opportunity. Second, for three years to come the rotating G20 presidency will be taken successively by a member of G7 and the EU Italy, an important member of the ASEAN Indonesia, and a member of the BRICS and an important representative of emerging powers India. Objectively, this will provide conditions of “geographic advantage” for the G20 to coordinate internal relationship of member countries and advance its institutional innovation. Third, the change on US domestic political cycle may nurture and promote conditions of “unity of the people” for G20 to reform and enhance efficacy. In comparison with the Trump administration that has created serious damage for the G20 in the name of “America First”, as senior politician of the Democratic Party, Mr. Biden, when assuming US presidency, will hopefully take a positive attitude toward major power multilateralism. Attempting to promote “US world leadership once more”, it is very likely for Mr. Biden to take the G20 as an important support for pursuing his global strategy. Although this may bring new challenges for emerging powers to promote reform on global governance system, it will doubtlessly be helpful for the G20 to play an even more important role in global governance in the future.   Although the COVID-19 pandemic renders anti-globalization forces potential energy, the new technological revolution in support of the development of globalization is accelerating, and it can be expected that post-pandemic economic recovery and rebound will happen, both of which will consist of an important opportunity for promoting a new round of globalization. Therefore, this pandemic crisis will not fundamentally reverse the megatrend of continued advance of globalization. At the same time, since China has contained the epidemic spreads on a large scale earlier and achieved economic recovery and development, the importance of the country in the process of globalization and the future international pattern will be unfolded further, with the profile of “the rise of the east and the decline of the west” in the international community evolving fast. As the largest emerging and developing country of the world, China’s active participation will be a key factor in improving the efficacy of the G20.
  Objectively, the COVID-19 pandemic has provided space and imperative of new agenda for the G20 to enhance macro policy coordination, and also created necessary conditions for the organization to play its role on the basis of global finance and in broader areas of global governance. The Extraordinary G20 Leaders’ Summit Statement on COVID-19 created a new model in responding to global public health crisis. At present, not only can the G20 accumulate experience and construct mechanisms on global public health governance, it will also be able to, in turning crisis into opportunity, construct a series of long-term mechanisms to monitor and respond to major global crises.
  In the G20 process of promoting major power coordination, China-US relations remains the most fundamental influencing factor. In the past few years, and especially since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the US has increased comprehensive containment of China, severely impacting major power concert within the framework of multilateralism. Against the backdrop of the change in US domestic political cycle, it will be decisive for the G20 process of multilateral cooperation whether China and the US can develop a new type of major country relations featuring no conflict and no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation. For China, while promoting improvement on China-US relations, it is necessary for the country to further BRICS’s internal cooperation and focus on resolving a number of obstructing factors.
  In face of the COVID-19 pandemic and other global crises including climate change, it is of important significance to uphold and give play to the role of the G20 in multilateral cooperation. In post-COVID era, concerned parties including China, in pushing for G20 reform and institutional innovation, should bear in mind the G20’s original mission of “crisis response”, take “crisis response” as the core content of the objective of “long-term governance, and actively grasp the historic opportunity nurtured in crisis to promote the common efforts of the international community in overcoming crisis and advancing the world toward sustainable peace and development.
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